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BIOBANKS AS A TISSUE AND
INFORMATION SEMICOMMONS:
BALANCING INTERESTS FOR
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE, TISSUE
DONORS AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH
KEN GATTER*

I. INTRODUCTION

The promise of personalized medicine is tantalizing. Match a patient's
specific genetic characteristics with a specific therapeutic intervention and patients
will be treated more effectively and have fewer side effects.' It is the future of
medicine, and medical centers, pharmaceutical companies and others are heavily
investing in its promise. Patient tissue, including blood and information derived
from this tissue is critical to realizing this promise. 2 Tissue information is essential
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1. See Ultan McDermott et al., Genomic Medicine: Genomics and the Continuum of Cancer Care,
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 340, 343, 346 (2011) (explaining how personalized medicine improves cancer
treatment). Cancer treatment is a strong focus in personalized medicine. For example, Gleevec, one of
the first successful targeted therapies, dramatically improved treatment and outcomes for patients with
chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), a cancer of the blood and bone marrow where white blood cells
expand uncontrollably. Id. at 343. The drug has far fewer bad side effects than previous therapies
because it is targeted to a specific abnormal protein on the cancer cells in CML, but not in most other
leukemia. Id. It targets the abnormal protein that makes the cancer cells grow and divide uncontrollably.
Id. Non-targeted chemotherapy kills normal and leukemic cells alike (people loose hair, have diarrhea,
etc.), but Gleevec preferentially inhibits CML cells resulting in patients having fewer side effects. Id.
However, the targeted therapy only works if the cancer cells have the specific target, and the only way to
know is to test a patient's leukemia cells. Moreover, a patient's cancer cells may be initially treated by a
targeted therapy but then develop resistance, which merits another round of molecular testing on the
tumor cells to identify the mutation and match new therapy. Research on tumors to develop treatment
regimes, including targeted drugs, is only half of the story; the other half is diagnostic testing on tissue
once the research is done. Id. at 343. The promise of personalized medicine, therefore, relies on human
tissue in the research and routine clinical settings.
2. Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to PersonalizedMedicine, 363 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 301, 302 (2010).
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for research and for routine clinical care in personalized medicine. 3 The most
valuable biobank tissue includes treatment and outcomes information, and it
increases in value as it becomes part of a larger collection--benefits increase as
collection size increases. 4 Unlike tissue repositories in the past, biobanks are more
than just archived remnants of excised human tissue. They are organized,
searchable, and data rich entities that, like commercial banks, make lending
decisions to qualified researchers or organizations. 5 It is no surprise that many
countries, including the United States 6 and the European Union,7 are investing in
and developing biobanking.
There are many different types of biobanks. Some are private not-for-profit;
some are owned and operated by pharmaceutical companies; some are funded by
national governments; many are university based; and still others are private-public
partnerships.8 Some biobanks have a specific disease in mind, whereas others
function as general repositories. 9 Some readily share tissue and information, others
are secretive.10 New joint undertakings between pharmaceutical companies and

3. Id. Margaret Hamburg, the commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and
Francis Collins, director of NIH, emphasized the need for testing patient tissue as part of routine clinical
care in personalized medicine, writing that the "success of personalized medicine depends on having
accurate diagnostic tests that identify patients who can benefit from targeted therapies." Id.
4. Alice
Park,
Biobanks,
TIME
(Mar.
12,
2009),
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1884779 1884782_ 1884766,00.html. Not
only is statistical power greater with larger numbers, but larger and networked tissue biobanks have the
additional advantages as explained by previous scholarship exploring the workings of various networks,
some of it in the health care setting. See Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy, and the Pursuit of
Interconnected Electronic Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REv. 631, 638 (2010) ("[E]ach user receives
more benefit as network's size increases."); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 479, 488 (1998) (stating that generally the value of
something increases as the number of users increase).
5. See Park, supra note 4 (comparing tissue banks to bank accounts).
6. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act at NCI, NAT'L CANCER INST., U.S. DEP'T OF
(last
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cancer.gov/aboutnci/recovery/recoveryfunding/cahub
visited Mar. 25, 2012) (reporting that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act included $1.3
billion to the NCI, $70 million of which will be devoted to a national cancer biobank); see also OFFICE
OF BIOREPOSITORIES & BIOSPECIMEN RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NCI BEST
PRACTICES FOR BIOSPECIMEN RESOURCES 1 (2011) (discussing the NCI's efforts in biospecimen

research).
7. See, e.g., BBMRI During the TransitionPhase, BBMRI, http://www.bbmri.eu/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2012) (describing the Biobanking and Biomolecular Resources Research Infrastructure (BBMRI),
which was one of the first European Research Infrastructure projects funded by the European
Commission (EC)). "BBMRI will form an interface between biological specimens and data (from
patients and European populations) and top-level biological and medical research." Id; David
Winickoff, Partnershipin U.K. Biobank: A Third Way for Genomic Property?, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
440, 441 (2007) (stating that many U.K. organizations will spend millions on research into biobanks).
8. See Winickoff, supranote 7, at 441.
9. See Park, supra note 4 (stating that biobanks can target specific diseases such as Alzheimer's
and diabetes).
10. See Winickoff, supra note 7, at 447 fig. 1 (providing a chart of the varying property
entitlements devised by the U.K. biobank including rights to access, ownership and control).
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universities are leveraging the financial resources of drug companies with the tissue
and research resources of academia." Many clinical cancer trials today have a
tissue collection element to better understand the relationship between treatment
and tumor biology, explore pharmacogenetics, or develop lab assays to help
targeted therapy. 12 There tends to be an overlap, redundancy and waste, because
tissue is often collected for only one purpose and the information gathered is
proprietary.
Biobanking has been given a green light, but it is forging ahead with many
unsettled ethical and legal issues associated with the collection, maintenance,
control and use of tissue and the information derived from tissue.13 This essay will
examine the advantages and shortcomings of the current state of legal rights
describing human tissue, and then offer a new way that better recognizes the
distinction between, and interdependence of, tissue and tissue information, while
balancing important interests and maintaining incentives to realize the potential of
personalized medicine. The new way begins by recognizing the unique attributes of
human tissue, including how it is related to information derived from it and its

11. See, e.g., Selina McKee, Pfizer Hooks Up with Uni of California in Novel Research Pact,
http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/10-112010),
17,
(Nov.
ONLINE
PHARMATIMES
17/Pfizer hooks up withUni of Califomiain novel researchpact.aspx (announcing that Pfizer
partnered with University of California for the purpose of biomedical research).
12. See Hamburg & Collins, supra note 2, at 301, 304; see generally INST. OF MED., A NATIONAL
CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2010) (The IOM report emphasized the

importance of annotated Biorepositories and the maintenance of tissue banks for the future of
personalized medicine, bemoaned that participation in clinical trials is not the norm today, and reminded
readers that it is only through clinical trials that personalized medicine can deliver its promise).
13. See Park, supranote 4 (explaining that privacy is the biggest challenge facing biobanks and that
the accessibility of DNA by the government makes people uncomfortable). Many scholars have
concluded that the laws regulating excised tissue ownership remain poorly defined and some have
pleaded for new approaches to address the issues presented by large scale biobanking. See Stephanie M.
Fullerton et al., Meeting the Governance Challenges ofNext-Generation Biorepository Research, 2 SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 15cm3, 15cm4 (2010) (explaining that new research can help address current
and anticipated problems with biobanks); Jennifer Girod & Katherine Drabiak, A Proposal for
Comprehensive Biobank Research Laws to Promote TransnationalMedicine in Indiana, 5 IND. HEALTH
L. REv. 217, 218-19 (2008) (describing lawsuits that have developed as a result of the uncertainty
surrounding the ownership of biobank tissue); Gail Javitt, Why Not Take All ofMe? Reflections on The
Immortal Life Of Henrietta Lacks and the Status of Participantsin Research Using Human Specimens,
11 MINN. J. L. ScI. & TECH. 713, 714-15 (2010) (examining the uncertain legal infrastructure
surrounding biobanked tissues); Sharon Lewis, The Tissue Issue: A Wicked Problem, 48 JURIMETRICS
193, 193-94 (2008) (discussing how advancements in personalized medicine may suffer from tissue
availability); Radhika Rao, Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human
Body?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 371, 371 (2007) (depicting the state of confusion and chaos involving
ownership and rights over the human bidy). In an article about the electronic medical record, Mark Hall
asks whether it matters that the law does not give a clear, complete and consistent answer to the question
of who owns medical information. Hall, supra note 4, at 642. He notes that the Coase Theorem says it
doesn't matter as long as transaction costs are not so expensive as to prohibit reallocation through
contracting. Id. Hall, however, concludes that property rights must be clear so that parties know their
default positions, and that such clarity is absent with medical information property rights. Id. at 637,
645.
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similarity to clinical health information. 14The argument continues with the help of
5
Henry Smith's work, and examines and describes biobanks as a semicommons.1
This essay concludes by outlining a legal infrastructure that would make
information derived from tissue in biobanks more accessible to the research
community and better able to protect the interests of people who have donated
tissue. 16
In Part II, this essay will examine the current legal landscape governing
human tissue, beginning with Moore v. Regents of the University of California.17
Moore opened the way for subsequent cases, like Washington University v.
Catalona18 and Greenberg v. Miami Children'sHospital Research Institute, Inc.,i9
which characterize patient tissue, almost by definition, as gifts to the research
institution. The practical approach taken by Moore and its progeny, which all
involved research universities, as well as the current federal Common Rule
governing research, have allowed tissue banking and biobanking to go forward
because the legal landscape has given research universities property interests in
tissue with little threat of tissue donors successfully claiming property or other
legal rights in their tissue, or any legal claim to profits derived from research on the
tissue. 20
Part III will explore a new legal description of excised human tissue derived
from understanding its unique attribute, that places it in a space between private
property, public property, and intellectual property. Although Moore recognized
the distinction between tissue and information supplied by the tissue, it failed to
explore the nexus between the two. Several attributes of excised tissue make it
unique. First, human tissue that is not going to be used for clinical purposes, such
as diagnosis, transplantation or transfusion, has no commercial value unless it is
transformed into a commodity. 21 Tissue increases in value as it is linked to
treatment and outcomes information, because the molecular characteristics of the
tissues gain meaning. 22 Only with this linked information can one determine, for
example, whether a particular mutation responds to a particular targeted

14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.A.
16. See infra Part IV.B.
17. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
18. 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
19. 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. E.g., Mark Barnes & Kate Gallin Heffernan, The 'Future Uses' Dilemma: Secondary Uses of
Data and Materials by Researchers and Commercial Research Sponsors, 3 MED. RES. L. & POL'Y REP.
440, 442-43 (2004).
22. See, e.g., N.J. Sebire & M. Dixon-Woods, Towards a New Era of Tissue-Based Diagnosis and
Research, 3 CHRONIC ILLNESS 301, 304 (2007) (noting that the value of one person's tissue increases
when it is combined with the tissue of others because large numbers of samples are often required to
obtain meaningful results from studies).
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therapeutic. 23 Secondly, one piece of human tissue generally means little but gains
value as it is linked with many others. 24 Thirdly, although human tissue is unique to
25
each individual, research on one person's tissue may benefit others. We have a
shared interest in tissue research because it may benefit us, our families, and our
communities. Lastly, whereas the tissue itself is rival (others cannot use it if you
26
are), the information from the tissue is non-rival. Understanding these attributes
of excised human tissue recognizes the similarities between information derived
from tissue and other clinical medical information. It means both types of
information may be best defined as a common shared resource to be used for public
benefit.
Part IV will describe biobanks as liberal semicommons, and how this
characterization will change the look of biobanks. New biobanks, while still
holding many sticks in the property bundle, will not hold all of the sticks, because
tissue and tissue information will be part of a semicommons. This approach draws
27
on previous property work describing semicommons and liberal commons. Such
an approach better recognizes the altruistic intent of tissue donors and the inherent
public health aspects of tissue research, while not tearing apart the current regime.
The proposed approach recognizes lessons taught by previous biobanks, promotes
long term benefits, such as encouraging patient participation in clinical trials,
leverages rare disease tissue, and generally promotes the sustainability of
biobanking. 28
Part V identifies areas of concern and identifies some of the implications of
treating biobanks as liberal semicommons.

23. See McDermott et al., supra note 1, at 343 (stipulating that due to the prevalence of disease
mutations, an approach to research using linked information-utilizing tissue samples from a large
sample of patients-is necessary to develop targeted drugs).
24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 n.2 (Cal. 1990) (explaining that
tissue from one person can lead to the development of therapies that will benefit others by
manufacturing the benefits of the tissue using techniques of recombinant DNA).
26. See infra notes 260-66 and accompanying text.
27. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 553
(2001) (defining liberal commons as any type of legal regime that provides a group of people "economic
and social benefits from cooperative use of a scare resource"); see also Henry E. Smith, Semicommon
Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. L. STUD. 131, 131 (2000) (defining
semicommons as a resource that is used by many, but from which individuals have separate ownership
rights in the individual property).
28. See infra Part IV.B.
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II. CURRENT LAW GOVERNING EXCISED TISSUE

A. Moore v. University of California Introduces the Issues
Moore v. University of California is a well-known and extensively analyzed
case, 29 which comprehensively addressed the legal rights of a patient who did not
know that his tissue was being used for commercial development (and for
research). 30 Scholars recognized early on that the case was important because it
addressed important evolving issues. 3' Moore is one reason why informed consent
forms for clinical trials routinely include statements that the research subjects have
no interests in any commercial benefit derived from research on their tissue. 32 It
also established the rationale behind why many research hospitals use broad release
forms for research use of tissue removed for clinical purposes. 33 The following,

29. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). A Westlaw search shows Moore is cited in more than 1000 articles
and thirty-five law review articles have Moore in the name of the title. See Peter Halewood, On
Commodification and Self-Ownership, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 131, 149 (2008) (emphasizing the
importance of Moore in both law and academia); Russell Korobkin, "No Compensation" or "Pro
Compensation ": Moore v. Regents and Default Rulesfor Human Tissue Donations,40 J. HEALTH L. 1,
3 (2007) (arguing that Moore and its progeny establish a default rule for patients in the research setting
assuming unselfish transactions unless the parties note otherwise). See generally Lisa Milot, What Are
We-Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts? The Tax Treatment of Transfers of Human Body Materials,
67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1053, 1086-87 (2010) (summarizing the Moore decision in the following
terms: "[h]uman body materials here are potentially the property of a third party, but not the person from
whom the material was removed").
30. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-82.
31. See, e.g., Halewood, supra note 29, at 149 (describing Moore as a seminal case because the
court addressed the social meaning and rights of the body). Whereas many scholars have recognized the
importance of Moore, several have also addressed how Moore falls short in the context of
biotechnology. See, e.g., Rhonda G. Hartman, Beyond Moore: Issues of Law and Policy Impacting
Human Cell and Genetic Research in the Age of Biotechnology, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 463, 464 (1993)
(arguing that there is a need to develop new law to govern biotechnology and new laws should strike a
balance between respect for individual autonomy and recognition of the value of biotechnology).
32. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 29, at 3. Regardless of whether a written and signed informed
consent has aspects of a contract, the effect of the decision in Moore has been that in the clinical setting
patients have no right to proceeds from their tissue unless separately negotiated. Id.
33. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 31, at 463 (noting that the Moore court imposed a duty on
physicians of full disclosure as to personal interests to patients as part of the informed consent process).
An example of a hospital "consent" is:
By signing my name below, I confirm the following: I have read (or had read to me) this
entire consent document. All of my questions have been answered. The Tissue Bank's
purpose, procedures, and risks have been explained to me. I voluntarily agree to
participate in the Tissue Bank. At any time, I can ask [Medical College of Wisconsin]
to stop collecting my Specimens/health information and ask MCW to delete/destroy all
my Specimens/health information, if it is still identified as mine. By signing this form, I
forfeit any future compensation related to the use of my Specimens or associated health
information and waive all legal rights to my Specimens. By signing this form, I
authorized Froedtert Hospital to release my protected health information to MCW for
the purpose outlined in this informed consent.
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rather lengthy, discussion of Moore is warranted because its various opinions laid
the foundation for subsequent law, as well as discussions about how our law treats
excised human tissue and various interested persons.
The Moore facts begin in 1976 when John Moore was diagnosed with hairy
cell leukemia. 34 Facing a grim prognosis, he sought out Dr. David Golde, a
35
hematologist and researcher at UCLA, who became Moore's treating physician.
Golde recommended that Moore's enlarged spleen be surgically removed, which
was then part of the standard treatment for hairy cell leukemia.36 Golde did not tell
Moore that he planned to use his tissue for research that had a potential commercial
benefit.3 7 After surgeons removed Moore's spleen, Golde and fellow researchers
38
used it in ways unrelated to Moore's medical treatment. They did not inform
39
Moore.
After the splenectomy, Moore, who lived in Seattle, traveled to UCLA for
follow-up visits from 1976 to 1983.40 During these visits Golde obtained additional
samples of blood, bone marrow, sperm and skin, which were all used for research
and further development. 41
In 1981 the Regents of the University of California, Golde, and Shirley
Quann, another researcher. applied for a patent of a cell line derived from Moore's
tissue (the "Mo" cell line), as well as for the various methods of using the cell line
to produce chemicals called lymphokines. 42 Shortly after the patent was filed in
1981, Golde asked Moore to sign a form that would grant the University of
California "all rights . .. in any cell line or any other potential product which might
43
be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained from me." Moore

Consent to Participatein Research: Informed Consent for the Use of Blood and/or Tissuefor Research,
FROEDTERT Hosp. & MED. COLL. OF Wis., http://www.mcw.edu/FileLibrary/Groups/Pathology/TissueBank/MCWTissueBankConsentForm.pdf (last revised Nov. 16, 2010).
34. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. Hairy cell leukemia is so named because the leukemic white blood
cells look "hairy" under the microscope. General Information about Hairy Cell Leukemia, NAT'L
CANCER INST., NAT'T INST. OF HEALTH, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/pdq/treatment/hairy-cellleukemia/Patient/page 1(last modified July 15, 2011).
35. See Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
Moore knew something was wrong when his gums began to bleed, his belly enlarged and he easily
bruised. Moore's spleen, enlarged by billions of leukemic hairy cells, made his belly swell, and his bone
marrow, also filled with cells, was no longer able to make enough platelets to keep his gums from
bleeding and his skin from bruising. Id.
36. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. When Moore complained about having to travel to Los Angeles and suggested that a
physician in Seattle could provide follow-up treatment, Golde offered to pay travel expenses and
provided lodging at an expensive hotel in Beverly Hills. Skloot, supranote 35.
42. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-82.
43. Skloot, supra note 35.
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refused. 44 The patent was granted in 1984.45 Golde and UCLA thereafter entered
into lucrative agreements with Sandoz Pharmaceuticals and Genetics Institute to
commercially develop the patent product.46
i. California Court ofAppeals Recognizes Moore's PropertyInterest in Tissue
In 1984, Moore sued Golde, Quan, UCLA, Sandoz and Genetics, stating
thirteen causes of action, including conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust
enrichment. 47 The trial court dismissed the case, but, in 1988, the California Court
of Appeals recognized Moore's conversion claim, emphasizing that conversion was
a strict liability tort and the key issue was Moore's ownership right in his excised
tissue, which Moore characterized as his personal property. 48 Driving its decision
was the majority's feeling that, "[a] patient must have the ultimate power to control
what becomes of his or her tissues. To hold otherwise would open the door to a
massive invasion of human privacy and dignity in the name of medical progress." 49
The decision saw a conflict between medical progress and human privacy and
dignity.50
The Court of Appeals understood that times were changing; tissue
traditionally had little financial value but now was taking on "astonishing aspects
of value," a fact that "requires examination of our understanding of the legal rights
and relationships in the human body and the human cell." 5 The court's reasoning
begins with an expansive definition of property as any right or interest "capable of
being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money value." 52 But
whether the cells had value was precisely the question to answer. 53 Did Moore's
spleen, marrow, and blood, as they left Moore's body, have intrinsic financial
value, intrinsic ethical value, or were they valueless? The defendants argued that
the diseased tissue had no value before their work developed the essentially
discarded, tissue into something of value. 54 Their work gave the tissue value, which

44. Id.
45. Id. at 482.
46. Id.
47. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482 & n.4; Skloot, supra note 35.
48. Skloot, supra note 35; Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'din part,793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
49. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
50. See id. at 509 (noting ethical concern about the links between academics and industry that allow
both sides to profit from biological specimens).
51. Id. at 504.
52. Id. at 505 (quoting Yuba River Power Co. v. Nev. Irrigation Dist., 279 P. 128, 129 (Cal. 1929)).
53. Id. at 504. The court stated that since Mr. Moore's cell-line had already been commercialized
by defendants, the only question it would consider was which party should share in the profits. Id.
However, because of the specter of slavery, the court approached the issue with caution, emphasizing
that it was not determining whether use of tissue "ought to be 'gift based' or subject to a 'free market."'
Id.
54. Id. at 507.
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made it property.55 Moore maintained his tissue had value, perhaps minimal value,
but enough, nonetheless, so that it could be converted. 56
The Court of Appeals responded to the defendants' argument, that Moore's
tissue had value only because of the work and intellectual capital invested, by
focusing on the difference between the tissue and information or ideas derived from
the tissue.57 First, it noted that the plaintiffs complaint alleged conversion of the
58
cells and not conversion of the "ideas gained from study of the cells." The court
then argued that, without the cells, the information would never have been
uncovered. 59 Therefore, the cells were of at least some value and there was a nexus
between the tissue and information derived from the tissue.60 The court cited a
number of property and privacy cases, as well as health and safety codes to make
the point that there was some value in the unimproved removed tissue, so that "it
cannot be said that a person has no property right in materials which were once part
of his body." 61
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals focused on the body and its
tissue. 62 It concluded that Moore could pursue a conversion claim because the law
did not say that Moore lacked any property right in his tissue. 63 Strong policy
considerations mandated a patient's ability to control what happens to their tissue
because to do otherwise would affront human dignity and privacy.64 More
importantly, the court, in holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for
conversion, acknowledged a distinction between Moore's tissue and information
from his tissue, while also acknowledging a connection between tissue and its
information. 65

55. Id. The idea that work gives property value corresponds with one interpretation of John Locke's
view of how a person's labor creates property. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND
A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, 111-12 (lan Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690) (arguing
that a man's labor is what makes those things, which exists naturally, his property).
56. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 499-501.
57. Id. at 507.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id. at 505-06. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012)
(vesting control over the disposal of a decedent's remains with the decedent's power of attorney or other
statutorily eligible family member); Venner v. State, 354 A.2d. 483, 485, 498-99 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1976) (holding a person must exert an affirmative property interest in excreted bodily material,
otherwise it will be deemed abandoned).
62. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 506-08 (discussing that link between the limited property interests in
one's own body and the centrality of one's cells and genes in forming an individual's unique identity).
63. Id. at51l.
64. See id. at 508 ("A patient must have the ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her
tissues. To hold otherwise would open the door to a massive invasion of human privacy and dignity in
the name of medical progress.").
65. Id.at 507.
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ii. The CaliforniaSupreme CourtAvoids an Information Anticommons but not
a PatentAnticommons in Moore
The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and rejected all
of Moore's claims, except for breach of fiduciary duty and informed consent. 66 The
Court rejected Moore's conversion claim, in part, because it felt that its approach
provided Moore with too broad of a remedy. 67 While concurring on the ultimate
judgment, the decision was split and engendered four opinions. 68
Justice Broussard, concurring and dissenting, interpreted the majority opinion
as holding that "apatient retains no ownership interest in a body part once the body
part has been removed from his or her body." 69 Broussard argued that the majority
could not have meant that ownership, or possession rights, could never lie in
excised tissue because a conversion claim would undoubtedly be available if a drug
company or university had stolen all of Moore's unimproved cells from the UCLA
lab. 70 Broussard agreed that patients retain no property rights in their excised tissue
in the usual case wherein a patient consents to an operation and to the use of tissue
for general research purposes, without the doctor's prior knowledge of the tissue's
scientific or commercial value. 71 Moore's case, however, did not fit into this
category because Golde knew that Moore's tissue was especially valuable; in fact,
this knowledge created the conflict of interest. 72 For Broussard, this meant that
Moore had a property interest, one stick in the big bundle, in his tissue before it
was removed.73 Moore's property right was his right to determine how his tissue
was going to be used while it was still a part of him. 74 Golde interfered with
Moore's "right to control the use of a body part by wrongfully withholding material
information from him before its removal . . . ."1s Broussard argued that Moore's

66. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990). The Court held that a
physician's duty to obtain informed consent includes disclosure of "personal interests unrelated to the
patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional judgment."
Id. at 483. The Court said nothing directly about informed consent for doing research on Moore's tissue,
but focused on the informed consent for treatment. Id at 483-85. Admittedly, had Dr. Golde disclosed
his research interests Moore would have known that his tissue was going to be used, but the Court does
not identify a separate interest in consent to using tissue. Id. at 485.
67. See id. at 496-97.
68. See generally id. Justice Panelli issued the decision of the court while Justices Lucas, Eagleson,
Kennard and Arabian concurred. Justice Broussard issued a concurrence and dissent, and Justice Mosk
dissented. Id.
69. Id. at 501 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 498-99. Broussard accuses the majority of failing "to maintain its focus on the specific
allegations," and of focusing instead on not wanting to impose liability on "innocent scientists"
conducting medical research on existing cell repositories. Id.
72. Id. at 499.
73. Id. at 502.
74. Id.
75. Id at 499.
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tissue was special; it was unique in its context, not unique because it had a specific
DNA sequence or because all human tissue is inherently dignified, as maintained
by dissenter Justice Mosk. 76
Broussard's reliance on context is commendable, but otherwise the decision
lends little to routine situations of tissue collection in clinical and research contexts.
What qualifies as "wrongfully withholding material information?" 77 Golde's
actions likely qualify.78 But ubiquitous general surgical consent forms, that include
boilerplate language about tissue possibly being used for unspecified future
research, likely do not. 79
The Moore majority used a two-step analysis to reject the conversion claim.80
The majority began by examining the network of health and safety statutes and
regulations and, unlike the Court of Appeals, concluded that these did not support
Moore's conversion claim.8' It then drove a wedge between Moore's tissue and the
information derived from the tissue, while ignoring the space in between. 82 The
Court did so by distinguishing between Moore's unimproved tissue and the
patented products.83 Recall that the Court of Appeals saw a nexus between Moore's
cells and its information and products, and described the patent as derived from the
cells. 84 The California Supreme Court majority, in contrast, saw them as separate

76. See id. at 501. Mosk recognized Moore's conversion cause of action, arguing, in part, that
failure to do so would encourage commodification of the human body. Id. at 516 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
He emphasized that Moore's tissue was a part of Moore's body rather than the informational attributes
of Moore's tissue: "our society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to respect the human body
as the physical and temporal expression of the unique human persona." Id. at 515. Mosk continued by
arguing that the researchers' use of Moore's tissue invoked our prohibition against slavery and
indentured servitude: "Yet their specter haunts the laboratories and boardrooms of today's
biotechnological research-industrial complex. It arises wherever scientists or industrialists claim, as
defendants claim here, the right to appropriate and exploit a patient's tissue for their sole economic
benefit . . . ." Id. at 515-16. Mosk, however, did not argue that Moore had a property right in the
information from his cells as a function of natural rights theory. See Catherine M. Valerio Barrad,
Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1037, 1062, 1064-67 (1993).
77. Moore, 793 P.2d at 499 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
78. See id. at 485 (majority opinion) (finding that Golde breached a duty owed to Moore by failing
to disclose his research interest).
79. See Lynch v. Brookside Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., No. CV990175019S, 2000 WL
1995285, at * 3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2000) (holding, in the context of a battery claim, that it was a
jury question as to whether the use of forceps was consented to under a general informed consent
agreement); Cf Rizzo v. Schiller, 445 S.E. 2d 153, 155-56 (Va. 1994) (noting that generalized consent
forms did not establish a prima facie case that informed consent existed in the use of forceps in the
process of a delivery).
80. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 488 (stating that the court will first determine if there is a cause of
action under current law and will next consider if the court should extend tort law to apply to this issue).
81. Id. at 489 nn.21-27.
82. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 492 (finding the patented cell line "factually and legally distinct" from
Moore's tissue).
83. Id. at 492-93.
84. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (noting how the plaintiffs cells and spleen were essential
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entities; it emphasized the "patented cell line [as] both factually and legally distinct
from the cells taken from Moore's body."85
The Court's second step was to consider policy matters in order to determine
whether conversion liability should be extended. 86 Two policy considerations were
of "overriding importance." 87 First, patients should be protected to allow
autonomous decision-making in their clinical care.88 Second, researchers should be
protected so they can continue to do research, because it was a socially useful
undertaking. 89 The majority felt that its decision outlining informed consent and
fiduciary principles adequately protected patients' autonomy. 90 Researchers,
however, had to be protected from "disabling civil liability" that would result if the
Court recognized conversion, as it was a strict liability tort. 91 No researcher could
be sure that their use of any cell sample was compliant with the donor's wishes. 92
Interestingly, the Court described the current state of cell lines as a tissue
commons, where cell lines and tissue are shared and the "exchange of scientific
materials ... is relatively free and efficient." 93 On the other hand, granting the
conversion claim would have created a tissue anticommons, where research grinds
to a standstill because the transaction costs of figuring out who has what rights are
too great. 94 Investment would dry up and the great promise of biomedicine would
fade. 95
What did the California Supreme Court leave us? It gave individuals no
property interest in tissue removed from their bodies, whether they were patients or
research subjects.96 It did avoid a tissue anticommons, which would have resulted

to the chain of research that eventually allowed the defendants to develop the commercially valuable
knowledge in question).
85. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492.
86. Id. at 493.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 494.
91. Id. at 493.
92. Id
93. Id. at 495. See also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition From Marx to Markets, IllIHARv. L. REV. 621, 624 (1997) (defining anticommons as a
situation in which "multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce
resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use").
94. Moore, 793 P. 2d at 494-95 (stating that increasing liability through conversion will stifle
research efforts). See also Heller, supra note 93, at 624 (referring to multiple owners all with a vested
interest as a tragedy of the anticommons).
95. Moore, 793 P. 2d at 495-96. Justice Panelli states, "the theory of liability that Moore urges us
to endorse threatens to destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical research. If the use
of cells in research is a conversion, then with every cell sample a researcher purchases a ticket in a
litigation lottery." Id.
96. Id at 488-89 (holding that Moore and future patients do not have a property interest in their
excised cells, falling short of meeting the requisite elements of a claim for conversion).
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from giving patients a strong property right in their excised tissue, but Moore did
not avoid a patent anticommons. 97 It recognized the social value and public health
benefit of research on human tissue, but did not fully understand tissue as a shared
community resource or semicommons.9 8 It failed to provide legal recognition of the
uniqueness of an individual's tissue once removed from the body, but did recognize
the uniqueness of the patented cell line. 99 Lastly, it failed to understand the nexus
between tissue and information.
Moore focused on consent to protect patients' interests, and, by doing so, it
emphasized autonomy interests. 00 The Court envisioned a future where a patient
refused treatment, or at least withheld consent for research, if she disapproved of
particular research, but only if specific research is anticipated at the time the tissue
0
The Court did not discuss whether a patient may direct the kind of
is excised.o'
research that might be done on her tissue, whether she has a right to find out about
what kind of research is being planned, whether she has access to research results,
whether she has the right to withdraw consent for use of her tissue or any
information already derived from research on her tissue, or whether she can direct
the destruction of her tissue and information.1 02 The Moore decision shares the
current federal human subject protection law's emphasis on autonomy and its
paradigm of understanding human subjects' interest within the context of clinical
trial research. 103

97. See also Lori B. Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking IntellectualProperty Rights, 3
NATURE REVS. GENETICS 803, 803-05 (2002) (discussing the negative impact of gene patenting on
research, medical treatments, and disease diagnosis); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in BioMedical Research, 280 Sa. 698, 699 (1998)
(arguing that the proliferation of intellectual property rights, especially upstream patent rights, lead to
underuse of resources because of increased transaction costs, strategic behavior and cognitive bias).
98. Moore, 793 P. 2d at 494-95 (describing the "critical role" of research on human cells, while
predicting the adverse effect of applying conversion law to tissue property interest upon the broader
scientific community). See also infra notes 270-76 and accompanying text.
99. Moore, 793 P. 2d at 490 (finding that the cells from Moore's tissue were not unique).
100. Moore, 793 P. 2d at 483.
101. Id. at 492. Justice Panelli wrote: "A fully informed patient may always withhold consent to
treatment by a physician whose research plans the patient does not approve. That right, however, as
already discussed, is protected by the fiduciary-duty and informed-consent theories." Id. The majority
did not address Broussard's distinction between Moore's situation where his treating physician knew
about the special value of Moore's tissue and the far more common context where tissue is removed for
diagnosis and banked for possible and unknown future research. See id at 498 99 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
102. Id. at 483-84.
103. Id. at 484-85. Barbara J. Evans, Waiving Your Privacy Goodbye: Privacy Waivers and the
HITECH Act's Regulated Pricefor Sale of Health Data to Researchers 5-6, 9 (Univ. of Hous. Law Ctr.
Health Law & Policy Inst., Working Paper No. 2010-A-22, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1660582 (pointing out that current law allows IRBs to grant consent waivers for
research on human tissue and health data collected as part of clinical care, and maintaining that our
current law was created during a time when concerns were to protect subjects from interventional
research, rather than protecting subjects from privacy concerns).
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B. Catalona and Greenberg are Moore's Progeny
Moore paved the way for future cases like Washington University v.
Catalonal04 and Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute,
Inc., 05 which characterized patient tissue, almost by definition, as gifts to the
research institution, and ensured that the light stayed green for biobanking. 0 6
Catalona, decided in 2007, is Moore 's progeny, although citations to Moore
are conspicuously absent in the appellate decision. Moore's conclusion that patients
have insufficient property rights in their excised tissue to support conversion may
explain its absence. 0 7 Catalonaconcluded that patient/subject's excised tissue was
a valid inter vivos gift, defined by the court as "a voluntary transfer of property by
the owner, without consideration or compensation as an incentive or motive for the
transaction." 0 This conclusion required an acknowledgment that patients have
some property interest in their tissue. 09 Unlike Moore, the issue in Catalona was
about tissue in a biorepository."1o Such tissue clearly had value, as evidenced by the
existence of the dispute and the large numbers of amicus briefs.I
The Catalona facts took place in a research setting and subjects had given
their informed consent for research on their excised tissue.1 2 Still, the Catalona
court could have followed Moore by focusing on the difference between tissue just
excised (essentially valueless to the patient/subject, according to Moore) and tissue

104. 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007). The case involved a dispute between a powerful research
institution and a well-known urologist/researcher who wanted to have his patients' banked tissue
transferred from the biorepository at Washington University (WU) to his new place of employment,
Northwestern University. Id. at 670, 672. Catalona sent a letter and release form to between 50,000 to
60,000 people asking that their tissue and blood samples be released to "Dr. Catalona at Northwestern
University upon his request." Id. at 672. The release form also stated, "I have entrusted these samples to
Dr. Catalona to be used only at his discretion and with his express consent for research projects." Id.
About 6,000 people signed and returned the forms. Id. The appellate court held that the tissue was a
valid inter vivos gift from patients to WU so that patients/subjects retained no sufficient ownership
interest to direct or authorize transfer of tissue to another institution. Id. at 674. As Moore prevented an
anticommons of each individual tissue donor increasing transaction costs to insurmountable levels,
Catalonaprevented a feudal system of researcher fiefdoms.
105. 264 F. Supp.2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
106. See id. at 1074 (finding plaintiff's tissue and genetic information to be "donations to research"
made to the institution); see also Catalona,490 F.3d at 674 (finding the research participants intended to
donate their biological materials to the institution).
107. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990) (Justice Panelli
considering several factors but concluding that Moore's conversion claim fails because "the use of
excised human cells in medical research does not amount to a conversion").
108. Catalona,490 F.3d at 674.
109. See id. at 671, 673 (describing the right and ability of a research participant to transfer his or her
tissue to a physician or medical technician, while holding that the research participant ultimately did not
retain property interests in their donate tissue).
I 10. Id. at 670.
111. Id. at 667. Amici included John Hopkins, Mayo Clinic, Stanford, University of Rochester,
Cornell, The Association of American Medical Colleges and Association of American Universities. Id
112. Id. at 671.
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in a biorepository.113 This is so because, the work needed to create and maintain a
biorepository gives value to banked tissue and information.11 4 A single piece of
tissue has negligible or no value, but gathered, organized, and annotated tissue has
significant value." 5 It is the combinative information that makes a tissue bank
valuable.11 6 By describing the excised tissue as a gift, Catalona, like Moore,
avoided a tissue anticommons." 7 Also like Moore, Catalona failed to recognize the
unique quality of the tissue. Although both understood that tissue was important for
biomedical research, neither case understood, or recognized, the tremendous public
health value of the information held within the tissue, especially the statistical
power of collective information.
Greenberg, decided before Catalona, is, as the federal district court described
the case, "a tale of a successful research collaboration gone sour."" 8 Greenberg's
facts are solidly and solely in a research setting," 9 but the opinion ignored its own
description of the research being "collaborative." Judge Moreno failed to recognize
any of the collaborating plaintiffs' contributions, dismissing five of the six causes
of action, including conversion, lack of informed consent, and misappropriation of
trade secrets, and only allowed the plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment to

113. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
114. See Catalona,490 F.3d at 670 (outlining the significant effort and funding required to maintain
WU's biorepository).
115. Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 23 (2005)
(describing the monetary value of tissue stored in biobanks and the value to society through medical
research of the tissue which could lead to the possibility of discovering new treatments for previously
incurable ailments).
116. Park, supra note 4 (describing that biobanks have the potential to revolutionize medical
treatment options because they contain a variety of tissue samples). The court could have explicitly used
a contract analysis, and in fact, the Catalonacourt analyzed the case facts like a contract, looking at the
language of the informed consent forms and placing significant value on the language in the genetic
research information brochure. Catalona,490 F.3d at 674-76. The court continued, adopting an unstated
adverse possession analysis, by looking at Dr. Catalona's actions to determine whether patients retained
any ownership interest, finding it "difficult to reconcile the use, consumption, and destruction of
biological materials by Dr. Catalona and the events that occurred during the research process with the
assertion the [research participants] retained an ownership interest in the donated materials." Id. at 676.
117. Catalona,490 F.3d at 675-76. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
118. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1066 (S.D.
Fla. 2003).
119. Id. at 1066-68. The facts in Greenberg can be summarized as follows: Dan and Debbie
Greenberg gave birth to two children diagnosed with Canavan disease, a rare, fatal, inheritable, and
incurable genetic disease. Id. at 1066. They sought out Dr. Matalon to help research and find better ways
to diagnose and treat the disease. Id. The family worked with Dr. Matalon to collect tissue and create a
Canavan registry, which included information about the Canavan families. Id. Matalon successfully
isolated the Canavan gene, and along with Miami Children's Hospital (MCH), patented the gene. Id. at
1067. MCH proceeded to exercise its patent rights and restricted the ability of various clinical labs to
test for the gene, which impaired carrier and prenatal testing. Id. This was contrary to the intentions of
the Canavan families who wanted their tissue and the registry information to be for the public good. Id.
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continue.120 The parties eventually reached a confidential out of court settlement.121
In Greenberg, the tissue donor's property rights were found to "evaporate once the
sample is voluntarily given to a third party," and, foreshadowing Catalona, the
decision observed that the tissues "were donations to research without any
contemporaneous expectations of return. "122
Moore, Catalona,and Greenberg all minimize tissue donors' interests, reflect
significant deference to medical research, and fail to understand and articulate the
relationship between tissue and tissue's information.1 23 All three cases avoided a
tissue anticommons and strengthened the tissue research status quo. Greenberg and
Moore distinguish between the patented product and the excised tissue based on the
work done by the researcher to obtain the information, but neither recognized the
donor's interest in or the value of the excised tissue.1 24 Catalona, however, did
implicitly recognize value to the excised tissue when it concluded the tissue was a
valid gift.125
C. The Proposalto Ease the Common Rule's Consent Requirementsfor Tissue
Research
The Common Rule, the federal law governing human subjects research, is
applicable to all research institutions that accept federal funding. 126 Current
interpretation of the Common Rule is that research on tissue, without personally

120. Id. at 1070-77. Moreno reasoned that an informed consent claim was misplaced because, unlike
Moore, the Greenbergfacts were not in a clinical care setting and Florida law did not include a duty for
researchers to disclose economic interests and other potential conflicts of interests because such a duty
would be "unworkable and chill medical research" as well as "give rise to a type of dead-hand control
that research subjects could hold because they would be able to dictate how medical research
progresses." Id. at 1070-71.
121. Joint Press Release, Canavan Found. (Sept. 29, 2003), http://canavanfoundation.org/news/0903_miami.php.
122. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp 2d. at 1074-75. Greenberg did not analyze whether the tissue transfer
met the elements of an inter vivos gift, but instead stated only its conclusion. Id. at 1074.
123. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673-75 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that the research
participant donated their biological materials as inter vivos gifts for the purpose of medical research);
Greenberg,264 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (refusing to extend the informed consent to economic interests for
fear that this will have a chilling effect on medical research); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793
P.2d 479, 488 (Cal. 1990) (declining to extend the liability theory of conversion because doing so would
stifle future medical research).
124. Admittedly, it may be, as Russell Korobkin argues, that Moore established no more than a
default rule for no compensation for patients and subjects who supply their human tissue, but it is a
powerful rule that requires significant effort, cost and organization to circumvent. See Korobkin, supra
note 29, at 3, 5-6. One example of a group successfully negotiating around the Moore baseline is a
group, PXE International, providing researchers with tissue samples from patients with pseudoxanthoma
elasticum in exchange for shared patent rights to the disease-causing gene. See Paul Smaglik, Tissue
Donors Use Their Influence in Deal Over Gene Patent Terms, 407 NATURE 821, 821 (2000).
125. See Catalona,490 F.3d at 674-75.
126. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409 (2010). The FDA has a similar, but not identical, set of regulations
that govern research under its oversight. Protection of Human Subjects, 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1- 56 (2010).
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identifiable information, is not within the scope of the rule and does not need
informed consent.127 However, obtaining identifiable private information, or
identifiable specimens, for research purposes is human subjects research, but may
be exempt, 128 or an Institutional Review Board (IRB) may waive informed consent
requirements.129 Some critics of the current regulatory regime argue that certain
aspects are overly burdensome while others provide insufficient protections for
research subjects.130 Other critics maintain that confusing regulations impede tissue
research.131 The Office of Management and Budget recently put together a group to
work on revising the Common Rule,132 which has drafted an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking asking for comments about how to clarify the requirements
on tissue research and enhance protections.133 The group proposes to require a
simplified consent process for individuals to allow future unspecified research on
tissue collected from them as part of clinical care or research.1 34 The simplified

127. Guidance on ResearchInvolving Coded PrivateInformation or Biological Specimens, DEP'T OF
& HUMAN SERVS., (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html. See also
M.B. Kapp, Ethical and Legal Issues in Research Involving Human Subjects: Do You Want A Piece of
Me?, 59 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 335, 336 (2006). The Office of Human Research Protections, which
oversees IRBs and research subjects to the federal Common Rule, declared in 2004 that research on
tissue that does not have personally identifiable information does not need to meet the informed consent
requirements of the Common Rule, because it does not meet the definition of research on human
subjects; however, it may be required under FDA rules and regulations. Id. at 336.
128. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2010) (exempting "[r]esearch, involving the collection or study
of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources
are publicly available or the information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that the
subjects cannot be identified directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects").
129. See § 46.116(d)
An IRB may approve a consent procedure which does not include, or which alters, some
or all of the elements of informed consent set forth in this section, or waive the
requirements to obtain informed consent provided the IRB finds and documents that: (1)
The research involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects; (2) The waiver or
alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects; (3) The research
could not practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration; and (4) Whenever
appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information after
participation.
Id.
130. See Ezekiel Emanuel & Jerry Menikoff, Reforming the Regulations Governing Research with
HEALTH

Human Subjects, 365 N. ENG. J. MED. 1145, 1145 (2011) (discussing the burdensome bureaucratic

procedures regarding research on human subjects); Ezekiel Emanuel et al., Oversight of Human
ParticipantsResearch: Identifying Problems to Evaluate Reform Proposals, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 282, 282-89 (2004) (describing the inadequacies with the current regulatory regime).
131. Emanuel & Menikoff, supranote 130, at 1148.
132. Id. at 1145.
133. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and
Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512 (proposed July 26, 2011)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164 & 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
134. Id. at 44522-24, 44527 tbl. 1. Written consent could be for open ended future research and a
standardized form would be made available. Id. at 44527 tbl. I. The requirement would only be
prospective; current approaches for existing tissue would be acceptable. Id.
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consent would be required regardless of whether the tissue research is identified or
de-identified.135 The proposal also focuses on data security and confidentiality and
seeks to place secondary tissue research studies (tissue already collected or
collected for clinical reasons) into a category "excused" from IRB review, provided
it meets the strict security and confidentiality requirements.1 36 The proposed
revisions for tissue research emphasize the protection of the information and
simplify, but still require, some informed consent; an approach apparently
consistent with public opinion.' 3 7
Other federal laws, such as HIPAA' 38 and GINA,1 39 also impact biobanking
and tissue research by focusing on information and privacy, and recognizing
research exceptions.140
Current case law is consistent with patient/subject providers of tissue having
no property interest,141 but biobanks would be wise to understand that the legal

135. Id. at 44525, 44527 tbll.
136. Id. at 44526.
137. See generally Christian Simon et al., Active Choice but Not Too Active: Public Perspectives on
Biobank Consent Models, 13 GENETICS INMED. 821 (2011) (concluding, on the basis of public surveys
and focus groups, that many individuals may want to make an informed choice before participating in a
biobank).
138. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(d)(2), .514(a) (2010). HIPAA's restrictions are also generally
inapplicable to health information that is de-identified. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (2010) ("Health
information that does not identify an individual and with respect to which there is no reasonable basis to
believe that the information can be used to identify an individual is not individually identifiable health
information."). The Privacy Rule recognizes that the research arena justifies disclosure without
patient/subject authorization in some instances. Id. § 164.514(c) (stating that limited health information
may be disclosed for research purposes if it is a limited data set and is released pursuant to a data use
agreement between researcher and covered entity).
139. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (Supp. III 2009).
GINA or the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act prohibits discrimination in health coverage and
employment based on genetic information. Id § 300gg-53. GINA prohibits employers, health insurers
or group insurance plans from requesting that an individual have a genetic test, but it has a "research
exception" to allow such a request if it is part of research provided the Federal government is notified,
the genetic information is not used for non-research purposes (i.e. underwriting) and the research
complies with the Common Rule and applicable state regulations. Id. § 300gg-53(d)(4). Many states
have laws protecting genetic information. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-8303 (2011) (prohibiting
employers from access or requesting genetic information to aid in connection with hiring, promotion or
retention decisions); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70G (West 2003) (prohibiting the testing of
genetic material without first obtaining prior written consent); OR. REv. STAT. §192.537 (2011)
(protecting an individual's genetic information as private information that must be protected from
unauthorized disclosure or misuse).
140. See OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
ON THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTIGATORS AND
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS 1-3 (2009) (noting that GINA prohibits discrimination but also

recognizes research exceptions); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff-5(b)(2) (West Supp. 2011) (outlining
how confidential genetic information should be treated).
141. See discussion supra Parts II.A.-B.
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status of tissue is not codified;142 new court decisions or changes in governing rules
and regulations may significantly alter the legal landscape.
III. SHARED HUMAN TISSUE INFORMATION
This part will explore a new legal description of excised human tissue derived
from an understanding of its unique attributes that places it in a space between
private property, public property and intellectual property. Others have similarly
43
argued that DNA is best described and treated as a common heritage,1 or have
44
maintained that tissue is best treated as informational property.1 This part will
also describe biobanking as having attributes of a semicommons and a liberal
commons. It will evaluate how informed consent fits into the protection scheme for
tissue information.145 Finally, Part III will conclude that tissue information is best
shared for the greater good, but recognizes that we need a legal framework that
recognizes the differences and similarities between residual clinical tissue and
146
biobanked tissue to maintain incentives and help make this work.
A. The Context of a Tissue Biobank and Tissue Provider's Control
What legal rights describe a piece of excised human tissue? Not surprisingly,
it depends.14 7 Similarly, the value attached to a piece of human tissue also depends
on how much information is attached to the tissue and whether the tissue is
considered singly or as part of a large collective.148 We can place tissue into a
number of categories. First, an unimproved single tissue sample has little research
value and will be legally considered an inter vivos gift from the originating
person.149 The second category is improved tissue, or tissue with additional

142. See John A. Robertson, Ethical and Legal Issues in Genetic Biobanking, in POPULATIONS AND
GENETICS: LEGAL AND SOCio-ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 297, 298 (Bartha Maria Knoppers ed., 2003)

(noting that many jurisdictions lack statutes addressing control of tissue and its genetic information).
143. See Pilar N. Ossorio, The Human Genome as Common Heritage: Common Sense or Legal
Nonsense?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 425 (2007) (analyzing the characterization of the "human
genome as part of the common heritage").
144. See Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and ProtectingInterests: Constructing Ethicaland Efficient
Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 119, 172 (2009) (arguing that human
tissue under an informational property regime would protect against unwanted use of cells).
145. See infra Part I1I.A-B.
146. See infra Part III.D.
147. See Rao, supra note 13, at 371 (noting that different legal rights attach to a person's body
depending on whether the individual asserting the rights is an inventor, a scientist, or the owner).
148. See Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for
Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 77, 83 (2002) (noting that
compensation for tissue samples would depend on its usefulness in research and development).
149. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673-76 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that where the
donor of tissue manifests a present intent to make a gift, the tissue, by itself, is considered an inter vivos
gift).
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information. 150 This tissue may have clinical information, including perhaps
outcome information, genomic information, and protein expression information.151
The additional information represents a researcher's work and investment, making
each piece more valuable, and hainv greater risk for privacy violations of tissue
contributors.1 52 Owners of this tissue, such as research institutions, have greater
legal protections, including conversion. 153 Third is a collection of improved tissue,
or a biobank.154 Whereas each piece of tissue has value, the sum is of greater value
than the whole.' 55 It is a searchable database.1 56 Numbers matter here, because
larger numbers will allow greater statistical significance.157 Similarly the legal
protections are also greater and include the near exclusive property rights enjoyed
by Washington University in Catalona'58 and potential unjust enrichment
protections in Greenberg. The last category, now far removed from the original

150. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 492-93 & n.35 (Cal. 1990) (stating
that the subsequent cell line and products are factually and legally distinct from the original cell material
taken from the donor because they have been improved by "human ingenuity"). Although the tissue at
issue in Moore or Catalona may seem to belong in the first category, the tissue better fits category two
because it contained diagnostic information. Very little tissue fits in the first category because much of
the tissue collected in the United States is tissue that is removed for diagnosis or treatment as part of
clinical care and stored in pathology laboratories. This tissue may have tremendous clinical value to the
patient because it may provide specific information about what therapeutic regime is best for the patient.
15 1. See Thomas F. Bumol & August M. Watanabe, Genetic Information, Genomic Technologies,
and the FutureofDrug Discovery, 285 JAMA 551, 551-52 (2001) (noting the use of genomic databases
and protein identification in developing future drugs); Mildred K. Cho, Understanding Incidental
Findings in the Context of Genetics and Genomics, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280 (2008) (stating that
human genetic and genomic research produces clinically relevant information).
152. See David J. Kaufman et el., Public Opinion About the Importance of Privacy in Biobank
Research, 85 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 643, 644 (2009) (highlighting the privacy concerns of tissue
donors); Ossorio, supra note 143, at 427, 435 (recognizing that treatments derived from research on
human tissue is often based on "years of labor and millions of dollars of investment" and that these
financial incentives may overcome social and moral interests).
153. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 492-93 (finding the cell line developed from Moore's tissue was
patentable because of the difficult nature of the "long-term adaptation and growth of human tissues and
cells").
154. See Silvana Bardelli, Stem Cell Biobanks, 3 J. CARDIOVASCULAR TRANSLATIONAL RES. 128,

128 (2010) (defining and explaining the attributes of biobanks).
155. See Jennifer E. Sanner & Lorraine Frazier, Factors that Influence Characteristicsof Genetic
Biobanks, 39 J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 25, 25-26 (2007) (noting the need to have a large and diverse
collection of tissue samples to further information about clinical research).
156. See, e.g., Peter H.J. Riegman et al., OECI TuBaFrost Tumor Biobank, 94 TuMORI 160, 160-61
(2008) (describing the OECI TuBaFrost biobank infrastructure which allows users to search the
samples).
157. See Sanner & Frazier, supra note 155, at 25 (stating that research based on larger sample sizes
will enable scientists to recognize the genetics responsible for an individual's susceptibility and response
to medical treatment).
158. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 994 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff'd, 490 F.3d 667
(8th Cir. 2007) (finding that Washington University exerted control over the biological materials); Scott
F. Gibson, The Washington University v. Catalona: Determining Ownership of Genetic Samples, 48
JURIMETRICS 167, 181 (2008) (noting that WU exhibited "all indicia of ownership" in the biological
materials).
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excised, tissue but nonetheless still dependent on it, is the patented product, for
60
example the cell line in Moore, 159 or the patented gene in Greenberg.1 This
category includes patents resulting from work done on biobanked material. The
legal rights form a continuum dependent upon how much information and potential
utility attaches to the tissue or tissue collections.161 Legal rights increase and accrue
to researchers and organizers of tissue, while tissue contributors remain largely
ignored.162 Current law lacks a coherent framework for describing and explaining
this continuum of legal rights.' 63
Commentators have argued that current law fails to adequately protect the
diverse interest of biobank tissue providers.164 One commentator, Natalie Ram,
identified four interests of tissue providers: control, confidentiality,
commercialization and cure.165 An interest in controlling the use of one's tissue,
including the use of one's DNA, stems from respect for human dignity and
autonomy.166 This interest is currently addressed through informed consent, but
questions remain about the adequacy and extent of informed consent.167 Can people
broadly consent for future research, or should future research be specified? When
and how should subjects be re-consented? Catalona and Greenberg show the limits
of informed consent's utility to further tissue providers' control.'16 Moreover,

159. See Jasper Bovenberg, Whose Tissue is it Anyway?, 23 NATURE BIOTECH., 929, 929 (2005)
(describing the court's finding that while the original cells were taken from Moore's body, the
subsequent patented cell line was "factually and legal distinct" from the original cells).
160. Id. at 930.
161. See Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights, Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological Change, 35 J.
L. & ECON. 199, 208 (1992) (stating "[t]he increased ability to manipulate genes" would extend property
rights associated with that tissue as a way of "protecting improved (rather than wild) genetic resources").
162. See Gibson, supra note 158, at 181, 185-86 (noting the decisions of Moore, Greenburg and
Catalona,which indicate that tissue donors lose their property rights, and citing to subsequent comments
from Professor Lori Andrews stating that the decisions "turn patients into treasure-troves rather than
partners in research").
163. Current law regarding human tissue creates special categories and treats the tissue accordingly.
For example, stem cells are given special status based on their potential for creating human life. See
Exec. Order No. 13505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 11, 2009) (recognizing the research potential of
human stem cells). Transplant tissue is governed by a set of special rules. See National Organ
Transplantation Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 273 (2006) (limiting the availability of organs for
transplantation to qualified nonprofit organ procurement organizations). Tissue stored in pathology labs
is governed by CLIA. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2006).
164. See Leslie E. Wolf, Advancing Research on Stored Biologic Materials: Reconciling Law,
Ethics, and Practice, II MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 99, 145-46 (2010) (advocating changing the current
regulatory approach to biological materials in order to better protect the risks to and concerns of
contributors of human tissue).
165. Ram, supranote 144, at 124-25.
166. Id. at 125.
167. Id. at 127-29.
168. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that individuals do not
retain an ownership interest in any biological materials that they voluntarily contribute after giving
informed consent); Greenberg v Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1069-71 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that Florida medical consent law does not apply to donors of
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research may impact family members, or other people who did not consent, but
who share genetic traits. 169 For example, inadequately authorized research on
Havasupai tribe members' tissue disclosed that aspects of the tribe's origin beliefs
were not scientifically verifiable.17 0
Respect for dignity and autonomy also requires that the interest in control
include the right to withdraw tissue from current and future research.' 7 1 It is in this
setting that control and confidentiality conflict.172 Anonymizing tissue protects
confidentiality, but unidentifiable tissue can no longer be effectively withdrawn. '
So, anonymizing tissue without the consent of the tissue provider conflicts with the
provider's interest in maintaining control.174 While informed consent in tissue
research protects autonomy interests, it may not wholly protect the interests of
tissue providers in controlling what happens to anonymized tissue. 175
One alternative would be to offer tissue providers the option to waive their
ability to withdraw their tissue, however the right to withdraw is well entrenched in
our current law. 7 6 The Common Rule 77 and the Declaration of Helsinki 78
mandate that informed consent include the right to withdraw. Many people
consider this right inalienable,1 79 although the equation may change when the
research is on already excised tissue rather than interventional research.

experimental tissue and extending it would grant research subject control over the progress of medical
research).
169. See Ram, supra note 144, at 129-30 (explaining how disclosing the results of genetic research
may cause embarrassment or distress to close blood relatives).
170. See Amy Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit Research of Its DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2010, at Al (noting that research suggesting the tribe's ancestors arrived in North America from the
Bering Sea clashed with ancient stories that the tribe had originated in the canyon). See generally Tilousi
v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 04-CV-1290-PCT-FJM, 2005 WL 6199562, at *3 (D. Ariz.
2005) (asserting that defendant used blood sample for research the tribe did not consent to, including
"ancient human population migration").
171. See Wolf, supra note 164, at 154.
172. See Ram, supra note 144, at 132 (explaining that complete anonymization of tissue samples
results in the donor being unaware of any ongoing research involving his tissue and eliminates the
donor's right to withdraw).
173. Id.
174. Id
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Terrance McConnell, The Inalienable Right to Withdraw From Research, 38 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 840, 844-45 (2010) (discussing the inalienability of a subject's right to withdraw from
medical research). But see Monique A. Spillman & Robert M. Sade, Clinical Trials of
Xenotransplantation:Waiver of the Right to Withdrawfrom a Clinical Trial Should Be Required, 35 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 265, 268-69 (2007) (arguing that a patient's ability to waive their right to withdraw
from continued monitoring after a xenotransplant is fundamental to the continuance of such procedures).
177. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2010).
178. WORLD MED. Ass'N DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL
RESEARCH
INVOLVING
HUMAN
SUBJECTS
3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/17c.pdf
179. See McConnell, supra note 176, at 845 (arguing for the inalienability of the right and asserting
that others' arguments to the contrary are not convincing).
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Another problem is that tissue may never be wholly made unidentifiable
because of new advanced techniques. 80 Our current regulatory scheme recognizes
greater protections for identifiable information in clinical and research settings. 181
HIPAA considers certain information "protected health information" (including
genetic information) only if it is "individually identifiable."' 8 2 But effective
protections cannot rely on anonymizing tissue if tissue cannot be effectively deidentified.' 83 Instead, we would have to rely on the security of information and
enforcement of strict penalties for privacy violations.
Tissue providers often have an interest in improving treatment for themselves,
their families, and the public.1 84 Additionally, tissue research is most effective with
attached information, some of which it can be used to identify a person.' 85 Because
of these two factors, there is an inherent tension between privacy interests and
maximizing research efforts. This tension is not only between researchers and
tissue providers but the interests of tissue providers may also be internally
conflicting.' 86 They may wish to maintain their privacy, and also wish to maximize
the research benefits.' 87
B. The IOMReport Addresses Consent in Information Based Research
The interaction between an individual's interests in control and privacy, and
the public's more general interest in maximizing the benefits of research is the
subject of a recent Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, chaired by Lawrence Gostin,
Sharyl Nass, and Laura Levit. 88 The report concluded that HIPAA inadequately
180. See Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, Genetics: No Longer De-Identified, 312 Scl. 370,
370 (2006) ("[Aln individual can be uniquely identified with access to just 75 single-nucleotide
polymorphisms."). But see Grigorios Loukides et al., Anonymization of Electronic Medical Records for
Validating Genome-Wide Association Studies, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 7898, 7900, 7902-03
(2010) (reporting an approach to generating data that eliminates the threat of individual reidentification).
181. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(l)-(2) (2010) (allowing the use of protected health information to
be used to create de-identified health information, and once such information is not individually
traceable, it can be used freely).
182. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(d)(2), .514(a) (2010) (stating that health information that is not
individually identifiable, or is de-identified, is not subject to the protections of individually identifiable
health information).
183. See McGuire & Gibbs, supra note 180, at 370-71 (explaining how protective measures are
needed to prevent the compromise of public trust due to rapidly proliferating DNA sequencing methods
that would render previously "de-identified" information identifiable).
184. See Ram, supranote 144, at 135
185. Id. at 136.
186. Id.
187. See id at 133-34, 136 (arguing that tissue providers' interest in control and cure conflict with
their interest in maintaining confidentiality, at least if confidentiality is obtained through de-identifying
tissue).
188. See generally INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY,

IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 12 13 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009). See also Mark
Rothstein, Improve Privacy In Research By Eliminating Informed Consent? IOM Report Misses The
Mark, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 507, 507, 509-10 (2009) (arguing that major flaws in the IOM's proposal
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protects privacy, and impedes valuable information based research.' 8 9 It advocates
for a clear difference between interventional clinical research and information
based research using medical records or stored tissue. 190 The IOM Committee
report reasoned that consent requirements are less essential for information based
research because consent requirements are "primarily considered a protection
against physical harm," and it noted that, historically, "a great deal of informationbased health research was conducted using personally identifiable health records
without the informed consent of the persons whose records were used."' 91 The
report proposed that, instead of relying on consent, which, it argues, is poorly
suited to protect privacy, the better approach is to directly strengthen and clarify
privacy protections and improve security safeguards, including penalizing
violators.192 The report urged the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
to expand information based research, and "[flacilitate greater use of data with
direct identifiers removed." 93 It foresaw information based research on a large
scale, and a need for reliance on technology to protect subjects' interests.194 The
report advises HHS to "develop a mechanism for linking an individual's data from
multiple sources such as databases so that more useful datasets can be made
available for research in a manner that protects privacy, confidentiality, and
security."l 95
According to the IOM report, the need to obtain informed consent hinders the
ability to put together a large data network.196 Informed consent is less important
in the context of information based research because current approaches overvalue
the ability of informed consent to protect individuals' interests.1 97 Instead, we
should strengthen effective privacy and security protections. Informed consent for
information based research helps "ensure that individuals are able to exercise
control over their personal information that is held by third parties, and to give
individuals the right to determine whether their personal information can be used in
a particular research project." 98 According to the report, participants should be
allowed to consent for future information based research so long as an IRB
to lessen informed consent requirements for human subject research include underestimating the risk to
individuals, overvaluing research interests, and inadequate justification to eliminate informed consent
for information based research).
189. INST. OF MED., supra note 188, at 16.
190. Id. at 264.
191. Id. at 247, 250.
192. Id. at 250, 257.
193. Id. at 264-265, 281.
194. See id. at 279 (applauding Congressional efforts to create a nationwide health information
technology (HIT) system because such a system will facilitate health research, but cautioning Congress
that privacy safeguards must also be developed).
195. Id. at 49.
196. Id. at 35.
197. Id. at 250.
198. Id. at 33.
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approves, and the new study "is not incompatible with the original consent." 99 The
creation of the new category of information-based research allows the JOM report
to justify its divergence from the Nuremberg Code's specific and fundamental
requirement that informed consent is essential in all research.2 00 Information based
research subjects' interests center on privacy, confidentiality, and control of their
tissue. 201 In contrast, interventional research directly affects the subject's body and
often impacts treatment choices; autonomy is more directly impacted. 202 Privacy
and autonomy have similarities, but information based and interventional research
impacts subjects differently, and informed consent is a better fit to protect the
latter. 203
Although Ram and Gostin's IOM Committee both describe a tension between
confidentiality/privacy and control/consent in the setting of informational
research,204 they fundamentally differ in how to resolve the conflict. Ram proposes
greater control for the tissue providers by granting them informational property
rights in their tissue and pursuing a copyright and copyleft approach. 205 The IOM
report, conversely, seeks to downplay the importance of individual consent but
strengthen security protections to guard against misuse of private information. 206
In summary, the IOMreport viewed current HIPAA and other applicable
regulations as lacking the clarity and uniformity needed to effectively promote
human research, especially information-based research, while meaningfully
protecting privacy. 207 It emphasized that both privacy and health research are
societal goods or public values, 208 and it carved out information-based research
(including tissue research) as a category of research that invokes the advantages of
scale and requires a protection scheme focused on privacy rather than the physical

199. Id.
200. See id at 124 (outlining the Nuremberg Code). Informed consent requires that a research
subject is informed of key facts about the research and any risks or benefits it poses. Id. at 126. The
IOM's recommendation that research subjects provide "future consent" for research diverges from the
Nuremberg Code because subjects will not be informed of what the future research involves. Id. at 33.
201. Id. at 33.
202. Id. The report also finds that "all interventional research" should be subject to "strong security
measures," which would include research that directly impacts treatment. Id.
203. See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1419 (1974) (explaining
that privacy rights are rooted in the presumptive right to individual autonomy and a reflection of the
American system of limited government). See generally Stephen Kanter, The Griswald Diagrams:
Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 28 CARDOZo L. REv. 623 (2006) (providing
background on the right to privacy).
204. INST. OF MED, supra note 188, at 35 (noting the tension between facilitating research and
protecting personally identifiable health information); Ram, supra note 144, at 132 (explaining that
anonymizing tissue samples to preserve patient privacy compromises the patient's interest in controlling
the use of her tissues).
205. Ram, supra note 144, at 142, 145-52.
206. INST. OF MED., supranote 188, at 35.
207. Id. at 31-36.
208. Id. at 31, 77.
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bodily integrity invoked by interventional research. 209 The researchers argued that
these improvements are needed because the current uncertain and non-uniform
privacy rules and overly stringent informed consent requirements hinder research
and do not fully recognize the public health benefits of informational research. 210
C. Biobanks and the Problem of a Tissue Anticommons
The IOM report described a tissue anticommons without using that specific
term. 211 Tissue donors and IRBs have the potential ability to exclude researchers
from using tissue that sits in tissue repositories. 212 This is not only because of
uncertain and inconsistent regulations and interpretations of privacy and informed
consent rules, but also because federal law gives tissue donors the right to
withdraw tissue samples after consent. 213 The result leaves no one with an
exclusive privilege to use a scarce resource, because multiple persons have a right
to exclude. Although the term "anticommons" is more commonly used to criticize
the current state of biotech patents, it appropriately describes biobanks because
continued uncertainty about what legal rights govern human tissue in a biobank
may limit downstream use. 214 The uncertainty of future consent, of when, whether,
and what type of informed consent will be required, along with the variability of
de-identified tissue, all combine to hinder tissue research without giving tissue
contributors added protections or information. 215

209. See id at 264-66 (advising Congress and agencies to develop a new approach to informationbased research that focuses on best practices in privacy, including program certification mechanisms,
and imposing real consequences for mishandling personally identifiable health information).
210. Id. at 16, 35.
211. See id. at 214-27 (finding that compliance with the Privacy Rule impeded researchers during an
information-based research study because it deterred recruitment and fostered unwillingness to grant
authorization waivers). "Anticommons" refers to the underuse of a resource because multiple owners
prevent others from having a privilege to use it. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 97, at 698.
212. INST. OF MED., supra note 188, at 223 (noting the difficulty at times for researchers to obtain a
waiver of authorization).
213. See id at 48 (noting HHS failure to provide clear guidance with regard to HIPAA's
applicability to information relating to genetic material has created uncertainty in the research
community); see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2010) (requiring that research participants be notified of
their right to discontinue participation).
214. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and PrivateDevelopment: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1725 (1996) (describing an
anticommons problem in biomedical research); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 97, at 698 (warning that
privatization of upstream biomedical research through patenting may create an anticommons that
impedes subsequent research largely because of high transaction costs); see also J.H. Reichman & Paul
F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at
315, 319-20 (finding that new laws encouraging privatization and commercialization of scientific data
disrupt the traditional custom of sharing data in the public domain).
215. Kapp, supra note 127, at 336-37 (noting the difficulty of providing generic consent for future
research projects).
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Indeed, Moore and progeny were concerned about creating a tissue
anticommons, although they too did not use the term. 216 The Moore majority
considered it an "important policy consideration" that they not create an
environment where researchers ("innocent parties") were "threaten[ed] with
disabling civil liability" that would result from having tissue with "uncertainty
about clear title."217 Moore noted that uncertainty about how courts will resolve
legal rights in tissue might derail the "infant biotechnology industry" for academic
researchers, and that the detrimental impact of uncertainty may extend to product
development as well as research. 218
Admittedly, tissue repositories seem different from Professor Heller's empty
Moscow storefronts in his description of the tragic anticommons. 219 Enforcement
actions for informed consent or privacy violations in tissue research are
exceedingly rare. 220 The Common Rule does not mandate enforcement, and there is
little active enforcement of the Common Rule and HIPAA regulations. 221 As seen
with Moore and progeny, the few tissue donors who have asserted their rights have
failed. 222 Therefore, "owners" of biobanks, whether they are academic medical
centers, pharmaceutical companies, or some other organization, seem to have an
effective privilege of use. Biobanks may seem a far distance from the empty
Moscow storefronts, but IRBs, tissue researchers, and others remain confused, and
there is significant variability in how and what kind of tissue research goes
forward. 223 Moreover, too many patents in biomedical research likely chill and
increase the cost of future research. 224

216. See discussion supraPart II.A-B.
217. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493, 94 (Cal. 1990).
218. Id. at 493.
219. See Heller, supra note 93, at 622-23. Heller defines anticommons as "a property regime in
which multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource." Id. at 668 (emphasis
omitted). He explains that multiple rights of exclusion are not necessary for the existence of an
anticommons, informal rights may suffice. Id. at 669. Heller also points out that anticommons are tragic
only when they lead to undesirable underuse, and that not all commons property is an anticommons. Id
at 677. See also Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986) (stating that a "comedy of the commons," which is the
reverse of the "tragedy of the commons," may lead to initial underinvestment).
220. See Ram, supra note 144, at 140-41 (noting that the Common Rule does not mandate civil or
criminal enforcement, and the federal government has seldom imposed penalties for HIPAA violations
with regard to information in genetic material).
221. Id. at 140 (citing Kendra Gray, The Privacy Rule: Are We Being Deceived?, 11 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 89, 89 (2008)).
222. Moore, 793 P.2d at 496-97 (finding Moore did not retain a property interest in his excised
cells). See also Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 676-77 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
plaintiffs did not have a right to direct or authorize transfer of biological materials after donation);
Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1075 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(finding that the tissues "were donations to research").
223. See Jennifer Girod & Katherine Drabiak, A ProposalFor Comprehensive Biobank Research
Laws to Promote TranslationalMedicine in Indiana, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 217, 221 (2008) (noting
inconsistencies between how the FDA and the Common Rule view IRB ability to waive written
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The two recent lawsuits involving Texas and Minnesota's collections of blood
spots for newborn screening illustrate the confusion and uncertainty surrounding
tissue information based research.225 Most states recognize an individual and public
benefit to newborn screening programs and forego parental consent, opting instead
for parental notification. 226 Some states destroy the blood spots after screening, but
227
some store them for future research or quality control for their assays. Texas had
the largest blood spot repository in the US, and had given or sold blood spots for
various research projects, including those conducted by universities, the

informed consent); David A. Hyman, Institutional Review Boards: Is This The Least Worst We Can
Do?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 749, 772 (2007) (concluding that, even if judged by the standard of "least
worst," IRBs "fall well short"); Jerry Menikoff, The ParadoxicalProblem with Multiple-IRB Review,
363 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1591, 1591 (2010) (noting that the multiple IRB reviews of multi-center studies
may decrease the likelihood that studies are following "relevant ethical standards"); Khadija Robin
Pierce, ComparativeArchitecture of Genetic Privacy, 19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 104-05 (2009)
(noting that tissue handling guidelines can be interpreted in inconsistent ways across IRBs); Mark A.
Rothstein, Expanding the Ethical Analysis of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 93 (2005)
(discussing IRB's difficulties with blanket consent for future research on patient/subject's tissue, which
although allowed under the Common Rule, should consider patient's objections to particular types of
tissue research).
224. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 97, at 698 (arguing that too many owners of previous
discoveries can "constitute obstacles to future research"); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket:
Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and StandardSetting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119,
144 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (concluding that infringement actions in several fields creates
considerable transaction costs which prevents the creation of new technology).
225. See Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011) (holding that newborn screening is an
exception to the Genetic Privacy Act, but only when the Department has express authorization to test for
congenital and hereditary conditions and does not provide for the Department to use the tissue samples
for any other reason); Settlement Agreement and Release at 3, Beleno v. Lakey, No. SA-09-CA-188-FB
(W.D.Tex. 2009) (outlining the settlement terms of a lawsuit between the Texas Department of Health
Services and plaintiffs, including the destruction of tissue samples being stored by the Department of
Health Services).
226. See Kenneth Mandl et al., Newborn Screening Program Practices in the United States:
Notification, Research, and Consent, 109 PEDIATRICS 269, 272 (2002) (noting that the majority of state
newborn screening programs surveyed required parental notification but not consent while some
required neither consent nor notification); B.A. Tarini et al., Not Without My Permission: Parents'
Willingness to Permit Use of Newborn Screening Samples for Research, 13 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 1,
%2
0attitudes.pdf (finding
3-4 (2009), http://www.cchfreedom.org/pr/tarini biobanking%20paperparent
that 76.2% of surveyed parents were "very or somewhat willing" to permit use of newborn screening
samples for research if permission was received, 2 8 .2% willing to without permission, and 78% of all
respondents were willing to have samples stored); Bradford L. Therrell et al., Committee Report:
Considerations and Recommendations for National Guidance Regarding the Retention and Use of
Residual Dried Blood Spot Specimens After Newborn Screening, 13 GENETICS MED. 621, 624 (2011)
(noting the need for an informed consent process for state newbom screening programs).
227. See Mandl et al., supra note 226, at 271 (noting that some states retain blood spots after
screening); see also TEXAS DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., Use and Storage of Newborn Screening
Bloodspot Cards, available at www.dshs.state.tx.us/lab/nbsdestructiondirective.pdf (requesting parent or
guardian authorization to destroy infant bloodspot cards); News Release, Minn. Dep't of Health,
Minnesota Department of Health to Begin Destroying Newborn Blood Spots in Order to Comply with
Recent Minnesota Supreme Court Ruling (Jan. 31, 2012) (describing the authorization given to the
Minnesota Department of Health to begin destroying the stored blood samples of infants).
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Department of Defense, and for-profit companies. 22 8 A class action suit was filed
against the state of Texas, claiming that the State had exceeded its authority and
violated both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions. 229 Texas argued that it had fully
complied with HIPAA and the Common Rule in its use of the de-identified tissue;
thus, had adequately safeguarded privacy interests. 230 Nonetheless, Texas settled
the lawsuit and amended the applicable statute by implementing an opt-out or
presumed consent provision for blood spots. 231 The statute retained newborn
screening as mandatory, excepting religious objections, and provided for retention
of the newborn blood spots. 232
D. The Casefor Public Ownership of Tissue Based Information
Using an approach similar to the public health centered IOM report, Marc
Rodwin has argued for the public ownership of anonymized or de-identified patient
data. 233 He begins by reminding us that patient information, commonly deidentified or anonymized, has poorly defined property interests, but is routinely
bought and sold. 2 34 De-identifying patient data results in privatization, even if it is
not clearly acknowledged as property by current law. This is a mistake because it
"precludes forming comprehensive databases required for many of its most
important public health and safety uses." 235 For Rodwin, the better way is for
patient data to be publicly owned. 236 He proposes mandatory federal reporting of
de-identified patient data to create aggregate data to promote "public health, patient
safety, and research." 237 The data would still be available to private entities, which
might analyze and sell results of their analysis. 238

228. Sandra J. Carnahan, Biobanking Newborn Bloodspots for Genetic Research Without Consent,
14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 299, 305 (2011); Use of Newborn Screening Blood Spots After
SERVS.,
HEALTH
STATE
TEX.
DEP'T
Screening,
Newborn
of
Completion
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/lab/nbsBloodspotsUse.shtm (last updated Apr. 26, 2011) (disclosing the
previous research uses of the newborn screening bloodspot samples).
229. Complaint, Beleno v. Lakey, No. SA-09-CA-188-FB (W.D. Tex. 2009).
230. Order Regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for
Summary Judgment Based on Mootness, Beleno v. Lakey, No. SA-09-CA-188-FB (W.D. Tex. 2009).
231. See Settlement Agreement and Release at 3, Beleno v. Lakey, No. SA-09-CA-188-FB
(W.D.Tex. 2009). See also Carnahan, supra note 228, at 308 (stating that the Texas statute was
amended); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 33.01 1(a)-(c) (West 2010).
232. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 33.011, .012 (West 2010).
233. Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36 AM. J.L. & MED.
586, 589 (2010). Rodwin notes that public ownership would better protect privacy and that there are
many examples of the public health attributes of medical information, including the mandatory reporting
laws and Medicare requirements for reporting cost data. Id. at 595-96.
234. Id. at 587-88.
235. Id. at 589.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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Rodwin sets forth a two-pronged argument. First, the typical reasons favoring
private over public ownership do not apply to patient data, and there is a tradition
of state and federal reporting requirements for patient information. 239 Second,
treating patient data as public property does not diminish privacy protections. 240
Risks are present whether private or public, and greater security measures are
needed in either approach. 241 Current privacy protections for patient information
are not based in patients having property rights in their health information, and the
inability of patients to control resale of their information leaves them with an
impotent either/or choice. 242 Public ownership of data may increase privacy
protections because it has the added advantage of increased public oversight to
ensure privacy guidelines are followed.243
Rodwin emphasizes the "well developed literature" that supports placing
scientific information in the public domain. 244 Current norms, federal policies, the
phenomenon of large networks, public health concerns, as well as the non-rival
attributes of information, support the use of public property approaches in science
and patient data. 24 5 Drawing on the work of Carol Rose and others, Rodwin argues
that patient data is a public commons (with privacy safeguards) because aggregate
patient data is like Rose's public roads, which are "most valuable when used by
indefinite and unlimited numbers of persons-by the public at large." 246 Moreover,
the many benefits of private property, such as incentivizing development, are less

239. Id. at 589-90.
240. Id. at 590. Rodwin emphasizes that he has in mind only de-identified and anonymized patient
data, but one wonders how effectively patient data can be de-identified or anonymized while
maintaining its value for useful comprehensive data. A. Cambon-Thomsen et al., Trends in Ethical and
Legal Frameworksfor the Use of Human Biobanks, 30 EUR. RESPIRATORY J. 373, 378 (2007) (noting
that population databanks without participants' medical data are of little value to researchers and can
lead to incorrect conclusions).
241. Rodwin, supra233, at 590.
242. See Paul Schwartz, Property, Privacy and PersonalData, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2076-78
(2004) (identifying a market failure in personal information because the individual choice is either to
refrain from disclosing any information or selling it with no ability to control whether third parties get
access to their personal information). Although not specifically about health information, it is applicable
in the health care information setting where such information must be routinely transferred for billing,
reimbursement, and medical care purposes. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2000) (noting that when individuals transfer property interest in data they
lose control over its use and confidentiality, and even private data made public is no longer protected by
trade secret law).
243. Rodwin, supra 233, at 614.
244. Id. at 597.
245. Id. at 597 & n.57, 598.
246. Id. at 599 (quoting Carol Rose to show that there is a longstanding acceptance of public
ownership and that conditions exist where public ownership or a commons has advantages over private
ownership). Rodwin does not, however, distinguish between the use of patient information itself and use
of the resulting analysis. See generally id. Patient information would not be directly used by "indefinite
and unlimited numbers of persons," but the results of analyzing the data would benefit the public. Id. at
599 (quoting Rose, supra note 219, at 774).
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applicable in the context of patient information because such information is already
routinely collected. 247 Privatizing patient information leads to prohibitive
transaction costs for downstream inventions, with little benefit. 24 8
There are important similarities between patient data and tissue-based
information, but they are not interchangeable. Unlike the IOM report, Rodwin does
not explicitly include tissue informational research in his analysis, although he
mentions "the interest in data resembles, in part, that of research subjects in how
their tissue or cells are used." 249 The similarities begin with both patient data
(medical information) and tissue data having ill-defined and unclear legal
ownership. 250 Secondly, both are fundamentally information. 251 Third, both would
be collected regardless of improved, better defined or more private property
oriented legal rules because routine patient care requires collection of information
and tissue. 252 However, additional worthwhile work would require added
incentives, whether the additional work is to aggregate patient clinical information
or conduct research on tissue and analyze results. 253 Fourth, both have tremendous
public health potential, but the public must maintain its trust and incentives must
exist to gather and organize the data. 254 Lessons from Iceland, 255 Myriad 256 and the
Framingham Study 257 show the importance of maintaining public trust. 258 Fifth, like

247. Rodwin, supra note 233, at 599.
248. Id. at 601.
249. Id. at 612 n.125.
250. Id. at 587 (describing the uncertain property rights associated with patient data). See also Ram,
supranote 144, at 139-40 (noting the law governing tissue information has unclear requirements).
251. Ram, supranote 144, at 139-40; Rodwin, supra note 233, at 589.
252. Ram, supra note 144, at 136 (discussing how individuals provide tissue information in the
course of routine patient care); Rodwin, supranote 233, at 590.
253. See Rodwin, supra 233, at 595 (discussing legislation that will offer physicians and medical
facilities financial incentives to adopt electronic medical records and ultimately encourage the sharing of
patient data).
254. Id. at 587, 601; Ram, supra note 144, at 137-38.
255. See Gisli Plsson, The Rise and Fall of a Biobank: The Case of Iceland, in BIOBANKS:
GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 41, 46 (Herbert Gottweis & Alan Petersen eds., 2008)
(noting that Iceland's Health Sector Database's opposition focused on potential violations of the patientphysician trust presented by the presumed consent aspect of the project).
256. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (upholding the Myriad company's patents on two human genes and the validity of gene
patents in general); see also Andrew Pollack, Despite Gene Patent Victory, Myriad Genetics Faces
Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, at BI (discussing the challenges that Myriad will face as a
business and how the company previously shared information about particular mutations increasing risk
of cancer, but recently opted to treat such information as trade secrets).
257. See Eric Niiler, Collapse of FraminghamData Deal HighlightsLack of CooperativeModel, 19
NATURE BIOTECH. 103, 103 (2001) (noting that attempts to analyze and sell data from the Framingham
heart study data was unsuccessful because of privacy and commercialization concerns of participants);
see also Christopher Heaney et al., The Perilsof Taking Property Too Far, 1 STAN. J. L. SCI. & POL'Y
46, 55-56 & n.64 (2009).
258. See Heaney et al., supra note 257, at 55-56 (noting the public relations disaster Myriad faced in
the wake of its scandal that was detrimental to the public's trust). Trust is also an important factor in
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patient data, granting individual donors' property rights introduces the risk of
anticommons and does not offer the typical advantages true for other types of
private property. 259
The most apparent difference between patient and tissue information is that
patient information and tissue-derived information are non-rival, but the tissue
itself is rival. 260 Tissue can be exhausted. Admittedly there are millions of tissue
samples, but tissues from people with less common diseases remain scarce. 261 If a
researcher uses all this tissue for a poorly designed project, there may be a social
cost. In addition to the potential personal costs of a damaged reputation, there will
be significant costs in replacing the scarce tissue so that others can use it. Tissue
information, in contrast, is non-rival. 262 Once produced, it can be used by many
people with no added cost.263 There is a continuum between classic private
property, such as a chair, and a perfect or inherent public good like Rose's public
park. On one end of the spectrum is a rival and wholly excludable good, and on the
other is a non-rival and non-excludable good. Tissue information is non-rival and
partially non-excludable. 264 Tissue is partially rival (typically there is enough for
more than one researcher), but exhaustible, and it is excludable. However, despite
clear differences between tissue and tissue information, the two remain inexorably
interrelated and each gains value as more information is added. 265

explaining the different rates of participation in clinical research between minority and non-minority
groups in the U.S., especially African Americans. See, e.g., Patricia G. Moorman et al., Racial
Differences in Enrolment in a Cancer Genetics Registry, 13 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS &
PREVENTION 1349, 1350 (2004) (finding statistically significant lower enrollment of African American
women in a cancer registry compared with enrollment of white women); see also Giselle Corbie-Smith
et al., Distrust, Race, and Research, 162 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2458, 2460 (2002) (noting that in a
national sample African-Americans were less trusting than white Americans in regards to their
willingness to participate in research).
259. Ram, supranote 144, at 122 & n.17.
260. See supra text accompanying note 26 (stating rival means "others cannot use it if you are"); see
also Yochai Benkler, An UnhurriedView of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L.
REv. 2063, 2066 (2000) (noting that information is generally understood to be nonrival); Anne
Cambron-Thomsen, The Social and Ethical Issues of Post-Genomic Human Biobanks, 5 NATURE 866,
871 (2004) (noting that the storage conditions of tissue samples in biobanks do not allow for multiple
use).
261. See Andrews, supra note 97, at 3 (discussing the extraordinary range of human tissue sources
available to researchers); see also Cambron-Thomsen, supra note 260, at 867 (2004) (noting that in
order to deal with the limited supply of certain tissues gathering multiple samples from one individual
may be necessary to reach an appropriate sample size for a given study).
262. Benkler, supranote 260, at 2066.
263. See MaryAnn Labant, Biobank Diversity FacilitatesDrug & Diagnostic Development, GENETIC
ENG'G & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEws, Jan. 15, 2012, http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/biobankdiversity-facilitates-drug-diagnostic-development/3983/ (noting that virtual biobanks provide greater
access to tissue samples).
264. Eric M. Meslin & Ibrahim Garba, Biobanking and Public Health: Is a Human Rights Approach
the Tie That Binds?, 130 HUMAN GENETICS 451, 459 (2011).
265. Cambon-Thomsen et al., supra note 240, at 866-67.
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BIOBANKS AS A LIBERAL SEMICOMMONS

A. How a Biobank Best Fits the Descriptionof a LiberalSemicommons
Biobanks contain human biospecimens and associated annotative
information.266 They are comprised of tissue and tissue information. 267 The
interaction between tissue, information, and large numbers of both brings value. 268
These attributes make biobanks a semicommons, defined by Henry Smith as
"exist[ing] where property rights are not only a mix of common and private rights,
but both are significant and can interact." 269 Tissue is rival and amendable to being
treated as private property, typically, as in Catalona and Greenberg, owned by the
entity administering the tissue repository. 270 Tissue information, in contrast, is nonrival and often shared within a group that can be described as a commons, such as a
university or research co-operative. 271 Describing biobanks as a semicommons
recognizes the interaction between the tissue and the information derived from the
tissue. By accurately describing biobanks as a semicommons, we can improve our
understanding of how to best govern them. 272
A commons is not open access. 273 A successful commons, Ostrom and others
have taught, has rules about entry and management. 274 Importantly, Dagan and

266. Id. at 866.
267. See Martin Asslaber & Kurt Zatioukal, Biobanks: Transnational, European and Global
Networks, 6 BRIEFINGS IN FUNCTIONAL GENOMICS & PROTEOMICS 193, 193-95 (2007) (describing

different types of biobanks and the various tissues and information stored).
268. See Cambon-Thomsen et al., supra note 240, at 866 87 (illustrating that as the size of the
collection increases so does the scientific value).
269. Smith, supra note 27, at 131.
270. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that Washington
University was the private owner of the genetic materials in question because they satisfied the
requirements of Missouri law as the entity owning the facility, indicating that tissue can be treated as
private property); Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1074-75 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (discussing the plaintiffs failed conversion claim and how the tissue is owned
by the research institution, not the individual, after it is donated).
271. See Meslin & Garba, supra note 264, at 459 (describing genetic information as non-rival).
272. Recognition of the dual nature biobanks is suggested by Yochai Benkler's description of a
continuum between wholly excludable goods and public goods. See generally Benkler, supra note 260.
He wrote: "Every good can be defined on a spectrum between a perfect economic good-which is rival
and excludable, and a perfect public good-which is nonrival and nonexcludable. Information is
generally understood to be perfectly nonrival and partially nonexcludable." Id. at 2066.
273. See Carlisle Ford Runge, Common PropertyExternalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource
Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context, 63 Am. J. AGRIC. ECON. 595, 596 (1981) (distinguishing a
commons from open access property).
274. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR

COLLECTIVE ACTION 90 (1990) (emphasizing the principles of past successful commons to include
"[c]learly defined boundaries," "[m]onitoring," and "[m]inimal recognition of rights to organize").
Ostrom and others first described and studied natural resources as they applied to the commons. Id. at 2
(referencing the Garret Hardin's theory of the commons based on cattle herders). Many have expanded
and adjusted the approach. See, e.g., JAMES M. ACHESON, CAPTURING THE COMMONS: DEVISING
INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE THE MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY 8-11 (2003) (describing elements of a
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Heller emphasize that we need not choose between the liberty offered by private
property approaches and the strict cooperation mandated by a commons. 275 The
"liberal commons" is a "participatory commons regime that also allows members
the freedom to come and go." 276 Their notion of a liberal commons recognizes the
ability of members to enter and withdraw from the commons without jeopardizing
the continued successful operation of the commons. 277 Under the model of a liberal
commons, patients/subjects may withdraw consent for use of their tissue at any
time, which protects subjects' interests, promotes trust, and respects ethical
norms. 278 One can, therefore, describe biobanks as having attributes of Henry
Smith's semicommons with aspects of Dagan and Heller's liberal commons. 279 No
other description accurately accounts for the interaction between tissue and the
information derived from the tissue.
B. Governing Biobanks as a LiberalSemicommons
We could treat all excised tissue not as private property but as common
property. Under this model, a large pool of researchers would have a right to use
excised tissue. This may address the concern that privatization leads to
commodification, but it does not change the potential for profit by institutions
while individuals who provided the tissue receive no financial benefit, and it does
not recognize any tissue provider interests. 280 Some research would improve
because of greater access to larger numbers of samples, but excised tissue is a
limited natural resource, and researchers would use it up quickly for both well and
poorly designed studies because there would be little cost, and significant potential
commons). Relying on previous work by Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, Acheson classified Maine's
lobster fishery, which is a renewable resource but subject to over-fishing, as a common pool resource.
Id. at 11. The fisheries are controlled for the benefit of the fishery, as well as the general public, which
continues to be able to eat lobster. Id.
275. Dagan & Heller, supranote 27, at 553.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Lori Andrews, Who Owns Your Body? A Patient'sPerspective on Washington University
v. Catalona, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 398, 402, 404 (2006) (explaining that research subjects in Catalona
had the right to withdraw their tissues and that current research practices and ethical regulations support
patient consent and foster trust between the researcher and the patient). Andrews also discusses why it is
important for courts to consider "the right of a patient to make decisions concerning the products of their
own bodies for diagnostic treatment and research purposes." Id. at 405. See also Dagan & Heller, supra
note 27, at 566-67 (defining characteristics of a liberal commons).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 269, 277.
280. See Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue. A Proposalfor Federal Recognition of
Human Research Participants'Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
257, 300 (2004) (explaining that human tissue is already commodified, despite the fact that the subject
does not receive benefits while researchers and shareholders of biotech firms profit); Michele Goodwin,
Altruism's Limits: Lmv, Capacity, and Organ Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 389 (2004)
(noting that it is a misunderstanding to think that by not compensating donors you are avoiding
commodification); Rao, supra note 13, at 371 (noting that currently everybody but the person who
provides the "raw materials" participates in the commercialization and commodification of the body).
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benefits. 281 It would be like putting extra cows on the commons. An open tissue
commons would introduce the problems described by Garrett Hardin in his famous
1968 article, Tragedy of the Commons: "Freedom in the commons brings ruin to
all." 282
For a limited natural resource, the ungoverned commons leads to overuse and
under-investment, but the tragedy can be averted. 283 There must be some ability to
exclude for the prudent utilization of tissue. One method, championed by Harold
Demsetz and others, is for individual privacy rights to internalize the negative
externalities present in a commons, thereby avoiding the tragedy. 284 This is the
approach suggested in Catalona, where the court granted the University strong
property rights in the banked tissue. 285 But there are many ways to govern or
manage a resource like tissue short of privatization. 286 Elinor Ostrom has helped us
understand that those using a common natural resource can govern its use, as long
as the commons meets certain design requirements.2 8 7 For Ostrom, the wellfunctioning commons has a strong limit on alienability (rights to the commons
cannot be transferred outside of the commons) along with a system of sanctions,

281. See Asslaber & Zatloukal, supra note 267, at 194-97 (explaining the research benefits to
different types of biobanks and the impact on drug research and development requiring large numbers of
samples to be statistically significant). See, e.g., Martin Yuille et al., II CELL & TIssuE BANKING 241,
243-44 (2010) (describing the UK DNA Banking Network's method of using "fair access" instead of
"open access" to biobanked materials to ensure the long-term availability of samples to the researchers
who submit investigation proposals with the best goals, limiting the researchers who would squander the
finite natural resources).
282. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244 (1968). Hardin, a
professor of biology, argued that the incentives of a commons are such that each individual will continue
to over-use the commons to the determent of others. Id. Things held in common, like water and air
should be, therefore, regulated to prevent abuse. Id. at 1245 (describing how water and air show the
tragedy of the commons through pollution and that coercive laws or taxing devices can be used to
regulate this type of commons). So, too, Hardin argues, the "freedom to breed" should be limited by
educating people about the dangers of the commons. Id. at 1244-46, 1248.
283. See id. at 1244-45 (highlighting the theory of overuse and under-investment and that education
is a means to avoiding the tragedy); Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons,
Global Challenges, 284 SCL 278, 278, 281 (1999) (explaining that over the years people no longer
believe the tragedy is inevitable and that theory is being reassessed based on scholarly discussions of the
conditions most likely to produce a successful commons).
284. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REv. 347, 348-56 (1967).
But see Samuelson, supra note 242, at 1127-29 (discussing the benefits and shortcomings of treating
personal data as property, particularly in the context of cyberspace).
285. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 670, 673-74, 676 (8th Cir 2007) (holding that the
university is in full ownership of the donated biological materials).
286. See Ostrom et al., supra note 283, at 279 (listing successful alternatives for governing common
pool resources, such as group property rights, individual property rights or governmental property
rights); see also Gardner M. Brown, Renewable Natural Resource Management and Use Without
Markets, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 875, 890 (2000) (explaining that a private property rights system is
the best option "only when it pays to do so").
287. See OSTROM, supranote 274, at 15, 18, 90.

338

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 15:303

community participation, and forums for discussions about management. 28 8 Ostrom
and others concentrated on the management of natural resources, but recently
scholars have extended Ostrom's approach to information and knowledge-based
goods. 289 Together, this prior work gives guidance on how to govem natural
resources like excised tissue and information derived from the tissue in order to
create a well functioning commons. 290
A biobank is more than only tissue. It is also information derived from
tissue. 29 1As mentioned, biobanks inexorably combine non-rival information with
rival, potentially excludable tissue, and both ideally gain greater value and
usefulness over time. 292 Tissue information can be shared with others for much less
than it costs to initially obtain the information, and there is public benefit to making
the tissue information widely available. 293 The potential problem is that there may
be little concrete economic benefits to create the tissue information if there is no
ability to exclude another's use. All one has to do is wait until another researcher
does the work and then get a free ride.
Avoiding this free rider problem and providing incentives is one justification
for creating intellectual property rights so that the producers of the product can
exclude others, make money through licensing, and recoup costs. 294 There are,
however, disadvantages with this approach. Enforcing exclusion is expensive,

288. Id. at 90 tbl.3.1. Ostrom did not require shared normative beliefs for members for the
common's survival. Id. In contrast, Michael Taylor says stable membership requires normative beliefs
beyond their collective action. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 27, at 564 (comparing the view of both
Ostrom and Taylor and describing that for Taylor "a community is a more or less stable set of members
with some shared beliefs, including normative beliefs and preferences beyond those constituting their
collective action problem, who expect to continue interacting with one another . . . and whose relations
are direct . . . and multiplex").

289. See Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95
(2010) (discussing the utility of applying Ostrom's approach to
intellectual property).
290. See id at 703-04 (providing guidance regarding governance mechanisms in a constructed
commons, emphasizing "formal access to public sanctioning and/or enforcement mechanisms" in
achieving effective self-governance); OSTROM, supra note 274, at 90 (articulating design principles that
are common to robust CPR institutions that can be used as guidance for other similar institutions).
29 1. Jordi Cami & Jaume Bertranpetit, The Promising Future of Biobanks: Building a Global
Perspective,in GENOMICS REVOLUTION: RESHAPING VACCINE DEVELOPMENT & DELIVERY 119 (2005)
("Biobanks are large collections of biological specimens (tissue and blood samples) and individual
information intended for increasing knowledge and research.").
292. See supra text accompanying notes 264-65.
293. See Labant, supra note 263 (noting the cost-effectiveness and public benefits of biobanks);
Andrews, supra note 115, at 23 (describing the benefits and uses of biobanks throughout the world).
294. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1024-25 (1989); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public
Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progressof Biomedicine, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2003, at 289, 295 ("[W]ithout patents to permit pricing in excess of marginal cost, no one would be
motivated to incur R&D expenses that were vulnerable to appropriation by free riders . . . ."). See also
Sinclair & Carroll Co., Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945) ("The primary purpose
of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement of the arts and sciences.").
CORNELL L. REV. 657, 670-71
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which will raise the price of the information, and lead to underuse and suboptimal
social benefit. 295 Also, in the context of biobanking, datasets are presumed not to be
subject to copyright, although publications analyzing and drawing conclusions
from the data are subject to copyright. 296 The challenge is typically not collecting
data, but making meaningful use of the data. Moreover, the free rider problem may
be minimal in the setting of tissue information. Researchers are driven by personal
ambition, peer recognition, promotion, generosity, reciprocity, and other social
motivations. Grants and prizes implicitly recognize the public good of tissue
information and fund much tissue research. 297 Being "first to market" offers
marketing benefits to commercial interests. 298 And on a larger scale, spillovers or
externalities enhance social welfare. 299 Easily obtained, cheap information will lead
300
to more information, not less.
A semicommons has its own set of potentially destructive incentives. A
biobank semicommons, with its combination of tissue and tissue information,
potentially combines the worst of both private property and commons. In a
commons lacking governance, the incentives are to overuse and under-invest, with
members of the commons enjoying short-term benefit without investment. 301
Researchers may strategically overuse tissue and administrators may strategically

295. See James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is A Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799, 2811
(2010); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 93, 99-100 (1997). See generally Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007) (discussing advantages and
disadvantages of governance and exclusion for defining intellectual property rights and comparing
within this context copyright and patent law).
296. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991) (noting that prior
to this decision some federal courts had extended copyright protection to unoriginal data compilations
on a "sweat of the brow" theory); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:
Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1868-69 n.13-14, 1895-1900
(1990) (citing cases where courts found works copyrightable due to the amount of labor expended by the
plaintiff and discussing the history of "sweat work" as the basis for copyrightability); 17 U.S.C. §102(b)
(2006) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
297. See, e.g., John Giardina, Federal Grants to Fund Tissue Regeneration Research, UCONN
TODAY BLOG (Feb. 8, 2012), http://today.uconn.edulblog/2012/02/federal-grants-to-fund-tissueregeneration-research/ (illustrating that the NIH has provided grants to support tissue research).
298. Cf Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 41, 46 (1988) (demonstrating that in the commercial context, the "first to market" gains
advantages with consumers with regard to their preferences and perceptions that often allows them to
gain a larger share of the market).
299. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 266 (2007)
(arguing that spillovers are common as evidenced by how no inventor has ever captured all of the social
benefits of his or her invention). Innovation spillovers promote further innovation, as evidenced by the
success of the Silicon Valley in contrast to Boston's Route 128. Id. at 270.
300. See id. (demonstrating how increased information led to greater innovation in Silicon Valley).
301. Ostrom et al., supra note 283, at 278.

340

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOt. 15:303

direct tissue use, while under-investing in tissue and database upkeep. 302 Freely
available tissue information may benefit some commercial free riders operating
independently of the peer incentives described above; however, a biobank
semicommons may be worthwhile because allowing multiple users broad access
will increase productivity, and better recognize both the public health and tissue
donor interests. 30 3
Our current landscape consists of hundreds or thousands of diverse tissue
repositories, many in research universities, but some in pharmaceutical companies,
government agencies, or commercial tissue banks. 304 Tissue may be collected for
one purpose and left unused thereafter. 305 Some university pathology departments
have tissue extending back more than 50 years. 306 Small, disorganized tissue
repositories have little value and little research potential. At best, we change this
hodgepodge into a federation of repositories that together make up a national
networked biobank where those who use the tissue must give back the information
they have gained from the tissue samples they use, thereby increasing the value and
usefulness of the biobank. Such a federation of tissue repositories would create a
biobank with a linked, vibrant, and growing database. 307 This approach would
extend to tissue research what Gostin's IOM report envisioned for other
information-based research, namely linking multiple sources "so that more useful
datasets can be made available for research in a manner that protects privacy,
confidentiality, and security."o30

302. See id (stating that the level of overuse has contributed to "central government control of all
common-pool resources").
303. The trick is to achieve the best balance between access and incentives. See Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REv. 483, 485 (1996)
(discussing the access versus incentives compromise at the heart of most policy discussions about
patents and about intellectual property); see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public's Right to
Health: When Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1335, 1385 (2009)
(identifying a "commons of biomedical research" as part of the public health interest).
304. Andrews, supra note 115, at 23.
305. See Alayne R. Brisson et al., Translational Research in Pediatrics: Tissue Sampling and
Biobanking, PEDIATRICS, Jan. 2012, at 153, 154 (illustrating how prospective sample collections use
tissues for particular research purposes and remaining portions are kept for future research).
306. Matthew A. Smith et al., Evaluation of Integrity, Regulatory Compliance, and Construction of
Searchable Databasefrom Print Reports, 135 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 753 (2011) (describing
how some biospecimen are kept for fifty years).
307. See NAT'L CANCER INST., NATIONAL BIOSPECIMEN NETWORK BLUEPRINT 7-9 (Andrew Friede
et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT] (envisioning a national biospecimens repository that employs
standardized procedures for storage and distribution, streamlines the collection and analysis of
biospecimen samples, allows for extensive sharing of specimens, and is accessible to researchers at
public and private institutions throughout the country).
308. INST. OF MED., supra note 188, at 11. See Peter H. J. Riegman & Evert-Ben van Veen,
Biobanking Residual Tissues, 130 HuM. GENETICS 357, 357 (2011) (noting that the collection of
samples and data must be completed in a standardized way and that regulation on the use of tissue
recognizes donors' interests).
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Under this approach, and compatible with current case law, repository tissue
would still be "owned" by the university, pharmaceutical company, or whatever
entity is responsible for maintaining the tissue and the database, 309 but they would
have only a few small sticks of the proverbial bundle. As a biobanking
semicommons, member researchers would have access to all relevant tissue and
datasets to enable greatest effectiveness. 310 Membership would span across
university, pharmaceutical, and public institutions. 3 1' This places strong limitations
on the tissue "owners" ability to exclude, but would not preclude reasonable use
fees. 312 In keeping with Henry's notion that "[t]he solution to a semicommons is
usually a governance regime rather than exclusion rules," 313 evolving rules,
regulations, and norms, including those already in place like IRBs, would govern
tissue distribution, and ensure privacy interests, although additional privacy
safeguards are likely needed. 314 Recent federal initiatives, like the cancer Human
Biobank (caHUB), are consistent with this approach, and federal funding
acknowledges the public health interests in biobanking. 315 A public-private
316
approach is important to maintain incentives for the upkeep of tissue.

309. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that donors do not
retain an ownership interest in biological materials); Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research
Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that individuals do not own their tissue
samples); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990) (holding that individuals do
not have an ownership interest in their cells after the cells have been removed from their bodies); see
also Karen J. Maschke, Biobanks: DNA and Research, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO
CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK 11, 13 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008) (noting
that institutions often own the "biospecimens stored in their repositories").
310. See Smith, supra note 27, at 131 (defining a semicommons); see, e.g., ELISA EISEMAN ET AL.,
CASE STUDIES OF EXISTING HUMAN TISSUE REPOSITORIES: "BEST PRACTICES" FOR A BIOSPECIMEN
RESOURCE FOR THE GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC ERA 158 (2003) (providing an example of a current

research network composed of over forty academic research centers and twelve private industry partners
where all participants have access to the biobank database).
311. See, e.g., EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 3 10, at 22-23 (describing a collaborative relationship
between pharmaceutical companies, academic institutions, government and companies in the biotech
industry).
312. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 299
(2005) ("In a semicommons, those with access to the commons cannot easily be excluded from its
privately owned attributes."); see also EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 310, at 117 (noting that the
University of Pittsburgh Health Sciences Tissue Bank provides researchers reserves some tissue for pilot
projects, but also maintains a fee structure for additional specimens).
313. Smith, supra note 312, at 294.
314. See EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 310, at 128 (noting that, in addition to IRB oversight, all of the
repositories in the case study protect the confidentiality of patients through guidelines, policies, and
procedures); see also INST. OF MED., supra note 188, at 98-99 (noting that the Institute of Medicine
recommends that all institutions involved in the collection, use, and disclosure of patient-identifying
information take measures to safeguard the security of health data, such as appointing a security officer
on IRBs and Privacy Boards, using encryption and encoding techniques, and implementing a breach
notification requirement).
315. See OFFICE OF BIOREPOSITORIES & BIOSPECIMEN RESEARCH, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., NCI BEST PRACTICES FOR BIOSPECIMEN RESOURCES 1, 6 (2011) (identifying guiding principles

for biospecimen resources in an effort to promote biospecimen quality and support adherence to ethical
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Tissue information, in contrast, would be a pure commons within the
biobanking semicommons. De-identified information, inexorably tied to its tissue,
would be available to all members of the semicommons, which would include
researchers and tissue donors.317 Confidentiality and privacy would be protected
through stringent security measures, and tissue would still be identifiable (coded, at
minimum) so that when a tissue donor wants to withdraw their tissue sample, the
tissue and its information can be found and destroyed.318 A record of consent,
withdrawal of consent, documentation of tissue destruction, and whether the tissue
donor wanted all or only future tissue information destroyed would be
maintained. 319
Public-private biobanks are not new, 320 and previous undertakings provide
valuable lessons. For example, Iceland's Parliament granted a license to DeCODE

CANCER
INST.,
The
Cancer Human
Biobank, NAT'L
and
legal
obligations);
http://cahub.cancer.gov/about/ (last visited Apr.18, 2012). The National Cancer Institute developed the
Cancer Human Biobank "in response to the critical and growing need for high-quality, well-documented
biospecimens for cancer research." Id. The caHUB initiative builds on the NCI Best Practices for
Biospecimen Resources. Id.
316. See Winickoff, supra note 7, at 445 (noting that the U.K. Bank has adopted a public-private
model, which promotes research, honors the intent of the donors, and welcomes a form of public
ownership). Public-private joint ventures are increasingly common in biotech. See, e.g., Peter Lee,
Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 917, 974-76 (2009). The 1986
Federal Technology Transfer Act authorized cooperative research and development agreements between
NIH and pharmaceutical companies for joint venture research and development. Id. at 974. Taxol, an
effective anticancer drug that was developed by NIH and Bristol-Myers Squibb, was developed through
a NIH-pharmaceutical joint venture. Id. at 975. Despite controversy over the pharmaceutical company
getting the better end of the Taxol deal, the GAO and others have noted that the drug has benefited many
cancer patients and has a tremendous public health benefit. Id. at 976.
317. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 307, at 44 (noting that all users, including government, industry and
academia would have access to de-identified information "associated with the biospecimens" in the
National Biospecimen Network.
318. See, e.g., EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 310, at 128, 185, 187. At least one repository has
implemented security measures, such as password protection, encryption, and firewalls, to protect
privacy and confidentiality. Id. at 128. A case study reflected that all repositories evaluated within the
study use an IRB to oversee practices. Id. at 185. Some also rely on separate bioethics advisory
committees to ensure privacy and confidentiality. Id. The best practice in the area of rights to tissue is to
allow a donor to withdraw his consent and to have the tissue and computer records removed from the
repository, provided the tissue is identifiable. Id. at 187. See INST. OF MED., supra note 188, at 99
(advocating for heightened privacy measures).
319. See, e.g., UNIV. OF OXFORD, OXFORD MUSCULOSKELETAL BIOBANK: STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURE
WITHDRAWAL
OF
DONOR
CONSENT
6,
8
(2011),

webleam.ox.ac.uk/access/content/group/1850f869-33c4-4dfl-af6b-dldle59c4401/documents/OMBMSOP%20024%20Withdrawal%20of/o20Donor/20Consent%20V2.0.pdf (stating that the donor's
withdrawal of consent must be recorded in the donor's medical records and including templates entitled
"notification of sample destruction and data deletion" and "notification to researcher of donor
withdrawal").
320. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 316, at 990 (noting that Iceland got a population-based biobank in
1996); see Helen Swede et al., National Population-BasedBiobanks for Genetic Research, 9 GENETICS
MED. 141, 142 (2007) (noting that deCODE Genetics, a private company, partnered with the Icelandic
Parliament to create and operate the world's first population-based biobank, Icelandic Health Database).
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genetics to construct a Health Sector Database (HSD) that combined genealogies in
the public domain, health care data with presumed consent, and blood sample data
with informed consent. 321 Although initially popular, 90 percent of Gallup-polled
Icelanders supported the HSD, the initiative eventually failed because of concerns
about property, control, informed consent, and privacy since a single commercial
interest, DeCODE, had privileged access and interest in biobanked material and
information. 322 Critics objected to the use of patient's health care data with only
presumed consent. 323 Such use interferes with a patient's ownership and control of
information that belongs to individuals and the public, but not a private
enterprise. 324 Treating biobanks as a liberal tissue semicommons addresses this
problem.
Some of the attributes of a tissue bank semicommons exist in the Cancer
Genome Atlas (TCGA), which started in 2006 with $50 million dollar investments
each from the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the National Human Genome
Research Institute (NHGRI). 325 The project recognized the advantages of a national
network of researchers pooling efforts, leveraging scale and infrastructure, and
making data freely and openly available. 326 It created a data portal that provides an
open platform for researchers to search, download, and analyze data generated by
TCGA. 327 The project includes a "Biospecimen Core Resource," which operates as
a centralized biobank. 328 It also invested significant resources for software
development (freely available), because it recognized that new technologies
produce immense amounts of data, and meaningful analysis is critically
important. 329 However, the lessons show that sernicommons governance should
321. George J. Annas, Rules for Research on Human Genetic Variation - Lessons from Iceland, 342
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1830, 1831 (2000); Jeffrey R. Gulcher & Kari Stefansson, The Icelandic Healthcare
Databaseand Informed Consent, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1827, 1827 (2000).
322. Gulcher & Stefansson, supra note 32 1, at 1827; David E. Winickoff, Genome and Nation:
Iceland's Health Sector Databaseand Its Legacy, Innovations, Spring 2006, at 80 80-81.
323. See Annas, supra note 321, at 1830-31 (arguing that the general rule regarding consent does
not apply to medical records that cannot be connected to a particular patient); Gulcher & Stefansson,
supra note 321, at 1827 (noting that "[s]ome argue that presumed consent is inconsistent with the right
of individuals to decide for themselves and actually amounts to no consent at all").
324. See Kenneth Gundle, Presumed Consent: An International Comparison and Possibilitiesfor
Change in the United States, 14 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 113, 116 (2005) (noting that one
of the objections to presumed consent is that it does away with individual autonomy and deprives people
of the right to control their own bodies).
325. See Program Overvie-The Cancer Genome Atlas, NAT'L CANCER INST.,
http://cancergenome.nih.gov/abouttcga/overview (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
326. Id.
327. See The Cancer Genome Atlas-TCGA Data Portal Overview, NAT'L CANCER INTS.,
http://tcga-data.nci.nih.gov/tcga/tcgaHome2.jsp (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
328. See Biospecimen Core Resources-The Cancer Genome Atlas, NAT'L CANCER INST.,
http://cancergenome.nih.gov/abouttcga/overview/howitworks/bcr (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
329. See Press Release, Nat'l Inst. of Health, The Cancer Genome Atlas Funds for Technology
Development, (July 2, 2007) (noting that NIH was awarded $3.4 million to fund innovative technologies
for understanding the molecular basis of cancer).
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include consent by tissue contributors to allow that their excised tissue can be used
for research, and that they have the ability to withdraw their tissue and their tissue
information. 330 The consent would include an acknowledgment that the tissue is not
wholly anonymous and that the tissue, and tissue information could be used for
unspecified future research, subject to withdrawal. The consent would also include
notification that tissue information already utilized in research analysis could not be
withdrawn, although it could likely be retrospectively anonymized. Tissue
contributors would be members of the tissue semicommons and have access to
secured de-identified data. 33 1 With this information they could participate in
debates about tissue use, and perhaps track how researchers have used their tissue.
Such an approach is consistent with the direction proposed by the current working
group that is looking at how to reform the Common Rule, which governs most (but
not all) research today, and it is also consistent with current approaches to clinical
information, which give patients the right to access their medical record. 332
C. Questions Raised
The liberal semicommons approach raises many questions. For example, how
might this new approach impact intellectual property derived from work on
biobanked tissue? Gene patents remain controversial, as illustrated by the
discussions surrounding the recent Myriad case about the patentability of the
BRCA gene. 333 Treating tissue and tissue information as a semicommons is

330. See EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 310, at 132, 144 (noting that concerning tissue repositories,
informed consent, a process that educates and provides information to the participant about the details of
the research, is crucial for protecting the interests and rights of research participants, and it is best
practice to allow the withdrawal of consent).
331. Cf BLUEPRINT, supra note 307, at 44 (proposing that de-identified tissue information could be
made available through a secure web-based platform). Some people may be concerned that tissue
contributors may misinterpret data, but most of the data produced would not provide clear answers and
recent controversy about direct to consumer DNA information suggests that such fears may be
overstated. See Cinnamon Bloss et al., Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Genomewide Profiling to Assess
Disease Risk, 364 N. ENG. J. MED. 524, 532 (2011) (noting that a recent survey of participants in a
direct-to-consumer DNA test study suggests that such fears may be overstated).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 132-37 (discussing the current working group); see also
supra text accompanying notes 126-27 (defining the common rule); see, e.g., Paul V. Steams, Access to
and Cost of Reproduction of Patient Medical Records: A Comparison of State laws, 21 J. LEGAL MED.
79, 99 (2000) (noting that patients have a right to access their medical records). Generally patients,
providers, hospitals and other institutions that provide medical services have access to patient medical
information. Id. Patients have a right to obtain copies of their medical records and may have their
medical records transferred to another physician. Id.; see Mark A. Hall & Kevin A. Schulman,
Ownership of Medical Information, 301 JAMA 1282 (2009) (observing that, while patients have the
right to access, clinicians are owners of patients' medical records).
333. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (upholding the patentability of the BRCA gene, mutations of which significantly increase the risk
of breast and ovarian cancer in persons who have the mutated gene). But see Andrew Pollack, Patent on
Test for Cancer is Revoked by Europe, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004, at C3 (noting that the European
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consistent with the Justice Department'S 334 tempering approach in Myriad and
better recognizes the community of tissue donors, patients, researchers, academic
institutions and pharmaceutical companies. 335 A recent Supreme Court decision,
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. University v Roche Molecular Systems,
Inc.,336 emphasized that the Bayh-Dole Act does not change the fact that individual
inventors, not universities, retain a central and often primary position in
patenting.337 The case reinforced the importance of agreements between
universities and their scientists. 338 This may be an opportunity for universities to
promote a semicommons approach that would increase the public benefit. Aligning
intellectual property law with the tissue semicommons is consistent with the patent
system's Constitutional objective to "promote the Progress of Science and the
Arts,"339 because it would minimize the tissue and patent anticommons, promote
research and the trust of tissue donors, and benefit the public good.
Perhaps the biggest objection to a liberal semicommons approach to
biobanking would fall along privacy concerns. 340 Current privacy protections are
insufficient. 34 1 In addition, the recent Supreme Court decision, Sorrell v. IMS
Health, Inc., which extended commercial speech protections to pharmaceutical

Patent Office revoked a U.S. biotechnology company's patent on a breast cancer genetic test because
there was not enough incentive to meet the patent protection qualifications).
334. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12, 17-18, Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 20101406) (arguing that isolated genomic DNA is not patent-eligible). Cf Ed Silverman, US Tells the WHO
to
Support
a
Patent
Pool,
PHARMALOT
(Jan.
20,
2011,
11:03
AM),
http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/01/us-tells-the-who-to-support-a-patent-pool/ (noting that the U.S. is
supporting patent pools for HIV drugs in certain settings). But see Ed Silverman, The Patent Poolfor
AIDS
Meds
Lacks
Drugmakers,
PHARMALOT
(Dec.
16,
2010,
8:07
AM),
that
(noting
http://www.pharmalot.com/2010/12/the-patent-pool-for-aids-meds-lacks-drugmakers/
pharmaceutical companies are less than enthusiastic about NIH's licensing of an HIV drug to
UNITAID).
335. See Heaney et al., supra note 257, at 60 (noting that biobanks can ensure that all stakeholders'
opinions regarding issues including regulation, benefits and uses of tissue, by including them in
consultative practices).
336. 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
337. Id. at 2195-97.
338. Id. at 2195, 2199.
339. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see Sinclair & Carroll Co., Inc., v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S.
327, 330-31 (1945) ("The primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the
advancement of the arts and sciences."). Contra Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, Inc.,
548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede
rather than 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."').
340. See Robert Pear, Tighter Medical Privacy Rules Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at Al l
(noting that criticism from groups like the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, which estimates that over "five
million people have been affected by breaches of medical information in the last 18 months," have
prompted the Obama administration and Congress to act to strengthen privacy safeguards); see also
INST. OF MED., supra note 188, at 12; Emanuel & Menikoff, supra note 130, at 1145.
341. See INST. OF MED., supra note 188, at 65-66; see also Emanuel & Menikoff, supra note 130, at
1145.
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detailing profiles of physician prescribing information (patient information deidentified), further blurs how to legislate privacy protections. 342 Sorrell shows how
information has monetary value, physician prescription information is clearly
valuable to pharmaceutical companies, and tissue biobank information also has
monetary value. 34 3
Much of the rich body of scholarly work about how to protect informational
privacy in the internet age applies to biobanks as semicommons. Some information
privacy scholars object to using property interests to safeguard private information
because property gives the right to freely buy and sell (it is freely alienable),
leading to market failures and inadequate privacy protections. 344 Others, like
Professor Paul Schwartz, advocate the use of property interests as the best way to
protect private information, although they acknowledge the necessity of strict
limitations, including limiting alienability and recognizing that privacy is a public
good. 345 The property framework offered by a biobank semicommons would
strengthen tort law's ability to set a "baseline" for privacy and confidentiality
protections. 346 A liberal semicommons approach to biobanked tissue is a tempered
property approach that may capitalize on some of the advantages of using property
to protect privacy and allow individuals greater control over "their" information,
but the details of the additional needed privacy protections need further work.
V. CONCLUSION

Constructing biobanks as a liberal semicommons would shift the theoretical
underpinnings of the role of consent and be in line with the direction of the recent

342. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (striking down a Vermont law that
restricts the sale, disclosure and use of records that reveal physicians' prescribing methods, because it
was in violation of the First Amendment and hindered the right to free speech in aid of pharmaceutical
marketing); see also Kevin Outterson, Higher FirstAmendment Hurdlesfor Public Health Regulations,
365 N ENG. J. MED e13(1), e13(3) (2011) (noting that Sorrell extends First Amendment commercial
speech protections to public health regulations, although federal privacy statutes like the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act are safe from First Amendment challenges).
343. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659-60 (observing that to maximize profits, pharmaceutical
salespersons promote high-profit drugs to targeted physicians they foresee being interested in
prescribing them).
344. See Samuelson, supra note 242, at 1138 ("Free alienability works very well in the market for
automobiles and land, but it is far from clear that it will work well for information privacy."); see also
Schwartz, supra note 242, at 2076 (discussing how existing markets for privacy lead to undesired results
and market failures).
345. Schwartz, supra note 242, at 2057, 2076-85 ("[A] strong conception of personal data as a
commodity is emerging in the United States, and individual Americans are already participating in the
commodification of their personal data.").
346. Ram, supra note 144, at 174 ("[T]ort is required for setting the baseline for what privacy and
confidentiality controls must protect. Tort identifies what reasonable expectations of privacy should be
and imposes liability on those researchers or other actors who fall short of these expectations.").
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proposal to revise the Common Rule 34 7 and recent research efforts that recognize
the tremendous importance of bio-informatics. 3 8 Moore and progeny's emphasis
on autonomy give little protection to tissue providers' interest in creating the
current landscape where tissue donors typically either consent to tissue use or
decline. 349 The shift toward stronger confidentiality and privacy protections, as well
as greater individual control of personal information, is a more fine-tuned,
narrowly-tailored approach. Of course, many questions remain, and the details of
how to govern the liberal semicommons biobank requires further thought and
work, and will evolve within the complex context of biobanks and public
opinion.350

347. See Emanuel & Menikoff, supra note 130, at 1149 (discussing the working group to revise the
Common Rule to provide for improved oversight procedures); see also supra text accompanying notes
126-27.
348. See, e.g., Press Release, NIH News, supra note 329 (noting that grants were awarded to fund
the genomic basis of cancer).
349. See discussion supra Part II.
350. Smith, supranote 295, at 1796.
Which degrees of exclusion and governance are called for and how best to manage a
semicommons are empirical questions. Recitation of the benefits of open access in
terms of nonrivalness or the benefits of entitlements in terms of incentives tells us very
little about the shape those entitlements should take or the forms of protection they
should receive. If we are to have property rights, why are they not very thin sticks to
engage in very specific uses? If someone invents a new compound, why would a patent
cover all uses instead of pre-identified ones (fuel-additive, lubricant, etc.)? If the public
domain is important why don't we specify the public rights stick by stick?
Id.

